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The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification ofaliens
This power is 'committed to the political branches of the
Federal Government.' Although it is 'a routine and normally
legitimate part ' of the business of the Federal Government to
classify on the basis of alien status, .. . and to 'take into account
the character of the relationship between the alien and this
country, ' . .. only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by
a State. I
I.

.INTRODUCTION

Many states-particularly those with large immigrant populations---view themselves as indentured hosts to undocumented aliens
residing in this country as guests of the federal government. Over the
past few years, states have raised growing concerns that the federal
government has not met its obligations when establishing and administering policy regarding undocumented aliens---concerns based on facts
and figures such as the $500,000-a-day rate of increase for undocumented alien health care expenses under the California state-funded Medi-Cal
program. 2 Putting such dramatic statistics aside, one sees that the
deeper thrust of the states' concern is that our federal system has failed
to protect them from unjust cost allocation in the area of immigration.
What is less apparent from the states' allegations is that the federal
government has left other victims in the wake of its failure. In
particular, the political process has created a backlash against disenfranchised groups, such as immigrants, who are the beneficiaries of state and
federal redistributive programs.
Recently, state perceptions of low federal accountability and unjust
cost allocation3 have appeared to catalyze not only anti-immigrant

1. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1981) (citations omitted).
2. Liese Klein, Wilson Vows to Defend Proposition, UPI, Nov. 21, 1991, at 13
(citing California Department of Health and Welfare).
3. Unjust cost allocation between illegal immigrant and legal resident or citizen,
and unjust cost allocation between the federal and state governments are two forms of
redistribution commonly cited in current discussions regarding fiscal responsibility for
illegal immigration. See, e.g., Keep Heat on President, Congress for Money to Support
Immigrants , SUN-SENTINEL, May 25 , 1996, at 18A; Pete Wilson, Illegal Immigration
Hurts America, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 25, 1995, at 11; Jim Specht, Republican
Task-Force Issues Tough-on-Illegal Immigrants Report, GANNETT NEWS SERVJCE, June
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sentiment among citizens,4 but also cynicism about the federal government as the states' cooperative partner in the federal system. In ratios of
approximately two to one, the American public believes that the United
States must curtail levels of immigration and should not provide
government assistance for those who legally immigrate to the United
States. 5 Initiatives taken in 1994, 1995, and 1996 to restrict alien access
to welfare benefits and to increase federal fiscal responsibility for
immigrants marked some of the most significant manifestations of such
sentiment, calling into question the welfare state's capacity to absorb
immigrants. The State of California passed Proposition 187, which
denies undocumented aliens education and, with the exception of
emergency medical services, health care benefits.6 Over fifty immigration bills directed against immigrants, taking measures that range from
ending all immigration for a period as long as five years to denying
education to illegal immigrants, have been introduced in Congress. 7 In
August 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which denies, among other things, food
stamps and Supplemental Security Income to most legal immigrants. 8
And, most importantly, six states, Arizona, California, Florida, Texas,
New Jersey, and New York (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
"immigration states" and "plaintiff states") brought suit against the
federal government, seeking reimbursement for selected costs resulting
from immigration. If one were to take current public sentiment as
reflected in legislative proposals, as a proxy for a welfare state's success
in "absorbing" legal immigrants, the United States would certainly score
quite low.

29, 1995; Richard C. Reuben, Law and Politics, The New Federalism, 81 A.B.A. J. 76
(I 995).
4. California Senator Diane Feinstein recognized this effect when she stated, "If
we fail to act, it's only going to continue to escalate ill-will toward all immigrants," in
reference to an immigration bill she reintroduced in June, 1994 to eliminate AFDC and
SSI for non-citizens, including legal aliens. Michael Doyle, Feinstein Gets Tougher on
Immigration, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 16, 1994, at A7.
5. Frank Wright, Legislative War Waged on Immigrants, Refugees; Foreigners
Seeking Haven Will Bear Brunt as Congress Pursues Ways to Cut Budget, STAR TRIB.,
June 4, 1995, at 15A.
6. Nearly sixty percent of California voters ratified Proposition 187. Dan
Walters, California Voters Join Nationwide Shift to Right, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 10, 1994,
at A3.
7. Ellen Debenport, In Divided Congress, Immigration Showdown Looms, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, May 25, 1995, at 12A. Presidential hopeful, Pat Buchanan, rode
on the anti-immigration wave and called for a moratorium on immigration to the United
States. Id.
8. PUB. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-2267 (1996) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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A.

A Modern Approach to Old Problems: A Paradigm Based on
Modern Economic Principles of Trust

The federal government appears to have adopted an agenda to shift the
risks and the costs of illegal immigration to the states. To what
implications does this agenda give rise, and how should federal
policymakers rethink the allocation of respective state-federal duties
associated with illegal immigration? Arguably, because the federal
government holds responsibility for inadequately supporting services and
public benefits for undocumented aliens, it also holds ultimate responsibility for creating the current animosity against legal and illegal
immigrants alike. This contention runs counter to popular thinking that
advocates the broad exercise of federal plenary power--thinking based
largely on the belief that the national government is a better guardian of
individual rights than the state governments.
Does such a state of affairs reflect the way things should be?
Unfortunately, the federalism principles articulated by the framers and
contained in the Constitution provide little guidance in constructing a
modem, intelligible theory of federalism to be applied to immigration
policy. Even if this were not the case, the task would likely be
formidable because issues of federal-state power relations have
metamorphosed to a point where the framers would find the current state
of federalism a faded vestige of their original conception.9 Consequently, any framework for analyzing how the federalism structure affects the
ability of the United States to absorb immigrants successfully must focus
on and extrapolate from the shared concerns and understandings
underlying the constitutionally-protected, dual-tier system of American
government.
This Article takes such an approach and concludes that the notion of
trusteeship was central to the federal government's relationship with the
state governments. 10 State demands for federal reimbursement of state

9. In the context of immigration policy, for example, there exist elaborate
covenants between the federal and state governments, including grants-in-aid for services
for undocumented aliens who reside in this country as a result of "the default of the
political branches of the Federal Government." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 n. l
(1982) (Burger, J., dissenting).
10. See infra parts V, VI. It is interesting to note that early analyses of
immigration policy and immigrant rights have often invoked the idea of 'contracting.'
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costs for immigration can be reconceptualized, in part, as ex post facto
challenges to the federal government's failure to meet a duty assumed
under an implicit trust that binds the states to their citizens and binds the
federal government to the states and the national citizenry. Given this
framework, the search for intelligible principles to guide judges and
policymakers must look beyond historical analysis to private law theories
of trusts, contracts, and remedies.
This Article goes further to argue that the status quo of intergovernmental fiscal relations in matters of illegal immigration contravenes the
principles of the original trust relationship established between the
federal and state governments by the Constitution. Applying principles
of the private law of trusts and drawing from the jurisprudence of federal
trusteeship duties to subordinate, sovereign regimes, such as the Native
American tribes, this Article strives to develop guiding principles for
future federal policymaking and remedial action. As a first step, this
Article methodologically rethinks the constitutional principles on which
the Supreme Court has relied when reviewing the constitutionality of
federal action claimed to preclude a state's ability to participate viably
in our federal system of government. As such, it does not focus on how
federalism should be structured, but instead, focuses on what responsibility the federal government has to the states affected by the exercise of
federal power. The overarching aim is to give modern, pragmatic
substance to the federal government's affirmative duty to protect the
states from fiscal subversion-a duty which originates in the federalism
principles articulated by the framers and contained in the Constitution. 11
B. Layout of the Article
The goal of this Article is to develop a framework for analyzing
claims such as those brought by the immigration states against the
federal government. In this pursuit, part II of the Article will focus on

However, in contrast to this Article, which addresses this problem in terms of trusts
between the states and the federal government, they addressed the problem as based on
a contract between the alien and the United States. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. I (1984).
Since under the classical order the alien's entry was conceived of as a privilege
whose continued enjoyment was conditional upon her compliance with the
formal terms that the government prescribed, deportation was simply the
revocation of her license, a reversion to the status quo ante. No procedural
safeguards for this reversion where thought to be necessary.
Id. at 27.
11. See Janice C. Griffith et al. , Judicial Review a/Federalism Issues in the Third
Century ofthe Constitution-A Dialogue, in FEDERALISM: THE SIDFTING BALANCE 77-90
(Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989) [hereinafter FEDERALISM] .
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the question of federal plenary power over immigration matters and
restrictions on state alienage classifications limiting immigrants' access
to the welfare state. Part III will examine the central claims of the
immigration states against the federal government. Here, the examination will concentrate on the state lawsuits seeking federal reimbursement
for the costs of services for illegal immigrants. Next, part IV of the
Article examines the constitutional underpinnings of federal duties to
states. It will focus on the ideas of John Locke and the notions held by
the Founders, examining the importance and centrality of the federal
system to the Constitution. Part V puts forth the trust model for
federalism and outlines the contours of the dual-trust paradigm. The
next section examines the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment
as sources of the federal trustee duty. Finally, the Article looks to
instructive forerunners which provide examples of the courts' treatment
of governmental trusts. Specifically, it addresses trusts over coastal
waters, Indian trusts, and trusts with associated states. The Article
argues that the courts should draw from jurisprudence in these other
areas of governmental trust when umpiring state claims for reimbursement of costs imposed by illegal immigration.
II.

IMMIGRATION POLICY: A TALE OF FEDERALISM GONE AWRY

Look to any of the central United States Supreme Court cases or law
journal articles regarding state alienage classifications or public benefits
for undocumented aliens, and you will probably come across common
constitutional buzzwords describing the sharing of power between the
federal and state governments: Federalism, intergovernmental relations,
supremacy, preemption, etc. Like other areas of policy which rely
heavily on the successful symbiosis of federal promulgation and state
implementation, immigration policy has become plagued with questions
regarding the locus of governmental control and accountability--questions of federalism. Traditionally, the courts have regarded
questions of federalism as inappropriate for judicial resolution, and more
appropriate for resolution through the political process. But such an
approach may not be suitable for a number of matters touching on
alienage and federalism, because it not only presupposes that the status
quo is the creation of popular will, but also fails to recognize that the
political process may be incapable of providing a remedy.
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Recently, the judiciary once again showed its reluctance to intervene
in state-federal struggles----this time in very high-profile cases regarding
immigration matters. A number of federal judges dismissed lawsuits
brought by California, Florida, and Texas which sought reimbursement
of the costs of providing for undocumented immigrants. 12 More
significantly, the Supreme Court refused to hear Florida's appeal. 13
The lawsuits had alleged that the federal government was encroaching
upon state sovereignty by forcing the states to divert state revenues away
from state programs to respond to problems created by illegal immigration.14
The states' battle for reimbursement was uphill from the beginning.
First, the states failed to find a remedy through the political process.
Second, the states' resort to the legal system faced a number of difficult
obstacles that served as signs of unlikely victory: The federal government's sovereign immunity, an attempt to use the Tenth Amendment as
a sword, 15 and the difficulty of asking the courts to decide an inherently
political question.
12. U.S. District Judge Edward B. Davis dismissed Florida's suit on December 20,
1994 stating, "The court recognizes that the state of Florida is suffering under a
tremendous financial burden due to the methods in which the federal government has
chosen to enforce the immigration laws. . . . But recognizing these facts does not create
a legal theory under which this court may grant relief. Without such a legal theory, this
court must dismiss this action." Reena Shah Stamets, Chiles' Suit Against U.S. Tossed
Out, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 21 , 1994, at IA. On December 14, 1994, U.S.
District Judge Filemon Vela gave the state of Texas additional time to file briefs in its
case against the federal government, but indicated that he was effectively dismissing the
suit. Christy Hoppe, Judge Rejects Role in Suit on Immigration, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 15, 1994, at IA. On February 13, 1995, U.S. District Judge Judith Keep
dismissed California's lawsuit to cover the expenses of providing services to illegal
immigrants. Tony Perry, State 's Immigration Suit Against U.S. Dismissed, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 1994, at A3 ; see also Nancy Cleeland, State 's Suit Over I/legal Immigrants
Dismissed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 14, 1995, at Al
Reading from a lengthy prepared text and citing case law, U.S. District Court
Judge Judith Keep rejected each of the state's eight claims. Several times she
said the question of reimbursement should be decided by Congress or the
executive branch, and pointed out the federal government is immune from
lawsuits seeking monetary damages.

Id.
13. Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094 (I Ith Cir. 1995), cert. denied, I I 6 S. Ct.
1674 (1996). The original complaint was filed in Florida in April of 1994. See infra
note 73.
14. See, Heather Ann Hope, Who Gets the Bil/for I/legal Immigrants? In the End,
Supreme Court May Decide, BOND BUYER, Sept. 9, 1994, at I .
15. For example, prior to any of the dismissals, constitutional scholars commenting
on the lawsuits showed great skepticism about states' cause of actions based on the
Tenth Amendment. One Scholar, Jonathan Varat, a professor at UCLA School of Law
stated, "They're trying to use the Tenth Amendment as a sword, not as a shield, and that
would be pretty far-fetched. It's a pretty aggressive use of it, which is okay, but it
doesn't even work that often as a shield." Id.
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The significance of the state lawsuits is certainly not a function of
their justiciability. That is, the cases are not "baseless" as the Department of Justice would have one believe. 16 The lawsuits may not have
a recognized cause of action, but the issues they raise call into question
the basic structural foundation of the American system of governance.
Moreover, they reveal a general deficiency in the jurisprudence of
federalism, highlighting the unwillingness of courts to protect and foster
structural arrangements of governance vital for a fair game of federalism.1 7
The legal field tends to discount non-justiciable questions, which are
usually the most challenging, troubling, and difficult for our institutions
to address. If the judiciary refuses to involve itself in the dispute, the
question of voluntary political remedy remains open. If the states'
remaining appeals ultimately fail, the question of the federal government's duty to the states will not die with them. The issues promise to
continue to challenge state and federal governments far into the future
until a satisfactory resolution is achieved. Thus, the question of
intergovernmental relations in matters of illegal immigration deserves
attention from the legal community-if not to find law-based solutions,
then to consider political ones.

A.

The Balance of Powers: The Court has Stacked the Weights in
the Federal Government's Favor

The federal government enjoys a preeminent role in regulating
domestic matters pertaining to aliens. In fact, it enjoys a freedom to
take actions against immigrants-legal as well as illegal--that would
likely be held inimical to principles of equal protection if applied to
citizens, such as racial minorities. 18 In contrast, state assertions of

16. See id.
17. See FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at viii (noting that one school of thought
"visualize[s] the Court as the guardian of a sphere of state and local autonomy from
federal control, a role in some respects similar to the one that the Court has assumed in
protecting individual liberties").
18. In the oft-cited case of Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976), the Court
upheld a classification of aliens that was based on duration of residence and residency
status. Congress had erected the classification for purposes of classifying individuals
ineligible for Medicare Part B. Id. at 69-70. Political flexibility, judicial manageability,
and limited resources (traditional legal arguments for Court deference to Congress in
immigration matters) were extended as arguments for deference in the alien benefits
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power over immigration and alienage classifications are regarded by the
courts as highly suspect, requiring review under a strict scrutiny
standard. 19 Naturally, the question of federal plenary power over
immigration matters has raised many questions regarding the appropriate
state role in making policies affecting immigrants within their borders.
The federal government possesses virtually absolute power over
policies concerning both immigration and immigrants. 20 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Constitution to grant the federal government
plenary authority over immigration matters, including terms and
conditions for residence in the United States, as well as conditions for
admission to and exclusion from the country. 21 And it has gone so far

area:
[T]he fact that Congress has provided some welfare benefits for citizens does
not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens. Neither the overnight
visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat,
nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a
share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own
citizens and some of its guests.
Id. at 80.
19. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The Court
reasoned that a
State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It
may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public
assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not
accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its
citizens . . . . The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise
invidious classification.
Id. at 374-75 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)); see also Toll v.
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1,30 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the Graham Court
as inferring " a congressional purpose not ' to impose any burden or restriction on aliens
who become indigent after their entry into the United States " '). But see, Tom Gerety,
Children in the Labyrinth: The Complexities of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 379,
393 (1983) (noting that, "[i]n less than a decade [after Graham] exceptions made for a
variety of public offices-including teachers and probation officers-{had] swallowed
up this newfound rule of suspicion").
20. Peter Schuck explains the expansive federal power to classify aliens as follows:
[T]he explanation can be found in the classical tradition's self-consciously
political definition of national community and in its norm of extraordinary
judicial deference to that choice. By the very nature of this definition, citizens
and aliens are almost never " similarly situated," while the federal government's
interests in emphasizing that difference--for example, giving preference to
citizens in order to encourage aliens to naturalize and thus join the national
community-is almost always deemed compelling.
Schuck, supra note I 0, at 24.
21. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens From Discriminatory
Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 315-317 (1977).
Rosberg distinguishes between the federal government's control over "an immigration
rule that operates as a condition subsequent and one that operates as a condition
precedent" to actual immigration. Id. at 332. He argues that the Court, in cases such
as Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), bas failed to draw proper distinctions between
immigration matters, for which the government may legitimately impose burdens upon
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as to say, "[ o]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete . . . :m
The Court has found federal authority to control and regulate
immigration to emanate from a number of constitutional provisions,
including the power granted to establish a uniform rule of Immigration
and Naturalization,23 international commerce power, and authority over
foreign affairs. 24 The concomitant constitutional restrictions on federal
immigration powers, such as the "uniformity" requirement for immigration and naturalization, have for the most part been reduced to "merely
hortatory." 25 Also tied to the notion of Congress's plenary immigration
power is the concept of sovereignty. According to the Court, regulation
of immigration, in so far as it signifies control of borders, not only
stands as an important symbol of the American polity's exercise of
autonomy against intrusion, but also symbolizes a vital component of
national security. 26
Matthews v. Diaz summed up the Supreme Court's position that
federal plenary power mediates in favor of judicial abstention from
review of federal actions affecting immigrants:
For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been

aliens, and nonirnmigration matters, for which invidious classifications carry the risk "of
impermissible injury to aliens" and threaten the country's historically embedded premise
that immigrants are full members of the American community. Id at 337.
22. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). For a general discussion of
congressional use of preemption power, see FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at vii.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Peter Schuck notes that the implicit, as opposed
to textual, nature of the broad federal power inferred from the Immigration and
Naturalization Clause has raised difficulties in determining the appropriate relationship
between the federal government's power to classify and other constitutional guarantees
placing restraints on government action. Shuck, supra note I 0, at 24.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3; see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318 (1936); Diaz, 426 U.S.
at 81 n.17; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (I 952)). The foreign affairs
justification for federal control over immigration includes concerns regarding "political
flexibility" in foreign affairs------a concern the court believes is not equally shared by the
states. See, e.g., Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83.
25. Gerety, supra note 19, at 38 I. The Court noted that "Congress might disregard
the constitutional policy of uniformity with impunity: uneven or inconsistent legislation
is hardly an unknown quantity in immigration." Id. at 380-81.
26. See John W. Guendelsberger, Equal Protection and Resident Alien Access to
Public Benefits in France and the United States, 67 TuL. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1993),
for more discussion on the reasons the Supreme Court has deferred to Congress in the
alien benefits area.
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committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions
in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a
wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political
and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary....
Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political
branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be
adopted only with the greatest caution. The reasons that preclude judicial
review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and
naturalization. 27

That such precedent promises to compel the Supreme Court's future
deference to federal authority over immigration and immigrant matters
is underscored by the Court's earlier admission that the preponderance
of legal precedent obliged the court to continue to give great deference
to the federal government with respect to immigration matters. 28 This
license of virtually unbounded federal control over matters affecting
immigrants has been used with little regard to questions of fiscal
accountability to states.
B.

A Higher Standard of Scrutiny for State Alienage Classifications

As a means of dealing with costs incurred because of illegal immigration--without demanding reimbursement from the federal govemment---states have attempted to restrict alien access to state public
welfare benefits. Such attempts have been largely unsuccessful. 29 The
Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to state alienage classifications that

27. 426 U.S. at 81-82. The Diaz Court cites Harisiades , 342 U.S. at 588-89, for
authority on the Federal Government's plenary power over immigration matters:
[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such
matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.
Id. at 81 n. 17. Whereas Diaz presented a due process question concerning an alienage
classification for the Medicare supplemental medical insurance program, Harisiades
presented a due process question concerning the retroactive application of a statute that
established Communist Party membership as a ground for deportation. In this instance,
Diaz serves to illustrate the indistinct lines that the Court draws between immigration
and immigrant issues. See Rosberg, supra note 21, for a discussion of the distinction
between alien immigration (condition subsequent immigration rules) and alien benefits
(condition precedent immigration rules).
28. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954).
29. See Graham v. Richardson, 430 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971); see also Peter H.
Schuck, The Great Immigration Debate, AM. PROSPECT at 113, Fall 1990 {"Traditionally,
immigration policy was designed to enhance the sovereign autonomy of the United
States at the expense of all other values, and the courts interpreted the Constitution
accordingly.").
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disparately impact aliens, and rejects the state justification of resource
preservation.30 The Court has also viewed discriminatory classifications
as affecting the naturalization incentive, a federal power upon which the
states have no business infringing: "Control over immigration and
naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a
State has no power to interfere."31 Thus, apart from the "political
function" exception, which enables states to determine the qualifications
of their most important governmental officials, states possess very
limited power to take actions against aliens. 32
To reconcile federal alienage classifications with those created by
states, the Supreme Court has often found state alienage classifications
invalid under the Supremacy Clause on the ground that they have been
preempted by national law. The doctrine of preemption recognizes
Congress' constitutional power to exclude the states from regulating a
given area. 33 Among other things, states may not enact laws or

30. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (I 982). The Court specifically stated that "a
concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the
classification used in allocating those resources." Id.
31. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977) (holding that a New York statutory
provision that bars resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
32. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 10, 13 n.17 (1982) (the Toll Court clarified that its "cases do recognize ... that a
State, in the course of defining its political community, may, in appropriate circumstances, limit the participation of noncitizens in the States' political and governmental
functions" (citing Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)); Gerald Rosberg,
Discrimination Against the "Nonresident " Alien, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 399, 400 (1983)
("The 'political exception ' may eventually swallow up the entire proposition that
alienage classifications are suspect . . . and it is plainly the strongest argument a state
can offer in defending a statue that disadvantages aliens.").
33. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SILENT REVOLUTION
3 ( I 991 ). A significant variation of formal federal preemption is informal preemption.
In contrast to formal preemption which is initiated by the exercise of preemptive powers
by Congress, informal preemption occurs when state and local governments apply for
and accept conditional grants-in-aid. Id. at 35. Grants-in-aid effectively provide the
national government control over States' expenditures. Some commentators have
observed that informal preemption has affected the roles of the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of federal government as well as the state governments, local
governments, interest groups, and citizens. For example, the Domestic Policy Council,
Working Group on Federalism, concluded:
[T]he net result of the massive increase in conditional funding . . . has been
to give the national government power to oversee the States' compliance with
a wide range of conditional grants, and thus to direct state policy in areas of
traditional state concern. ... The carrot of federal funding has often induced
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regulations that are inconsistent with federal law regarding either
immigration or immigrants. And preemption goes so far as to prohibit
states from imposing any type of burden not sanctioned by Congress in
admitting aliens to the United States. In light of federal plenary power
over immigration matters, virtually all state laws and regulations that
touch on immigration are highly susceptible to judicial invalidation on
preemption grounds.
The Supreme Court case of Toll v. Moreno 34 provides an illustration
of preemption analysis applied to classifications harming aliens. In Toll,
the Supreme Court considered whether a policy of the University of
Maryland, a state-operated university that denied in-state status and
derivative preferential treatment for tuition and fees to resident aliens
holding G-4 visas, violated the Supremacy Clause. 35 The Court held
that the University's policy was invalid under the Supremacy Clause,
stating, "[State] regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if
it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress."36 The
Court regarded Maryland's policy in this case to be a frustration of
federal treaties, statutes, and international agreements giving G-4 aliens
special tax exemptions. 37 Furthermore, the Court found that Congress
had explicitly decided not to disallow G-4 aliens from acquiring
domicile. 38 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted: "[T]he Court suggests
in dicta that any state law which discriminates against lawfully admitted
aliens is void, presumably without regard to the strength of the State's
justification, if Congress did not contemplate such a law."39
Of course, as the Court noted in Toll as well as in the earlier case of
De Canas v. Bica,40 the federal government can empower the states to

States to take steps that they might otherwise forego or actively resist.
Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in America: An Historical Overview in
FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at 11 (quoting DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, WORKING
GROUP ON FEDERALISM, THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA (1986)). Notably,
just as state governments may appear to "voluntarily" apply for conditional grants-in-aid,
they may appear to "voluntarily" institute programs and expend funds on behalf of
illegal immigrants.
34. 458 U.S. I (1982).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at I.
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). In De Canas, the Court addressed whether a California
statute making it illegal to employ illegal aliens in some circumstances was invalid under
the Supremacy Clause. The Court upheld the state statute, reasoning that Congress had
intended to allow states, "to the extent consistent with federal law, [to] regulate the
employment of illegal aliens." Id. at 361.
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enact legislation that arguably discriminates against aliens if it is
consistent with federal law. For example, the enactment of the
Immigration and Nationality Act did not negate consistent state
regulations pertaining to aliens, even if those regulations were discriminatory.41 Generally, silence or apathy on the part of the federal
government is not, however, sufficient to authorize state policies
discriminating against aliens because it would open up the possibility for
state usurpation of federal plenary power. The federal government must
have shown some intention to allow such state action, which would then
be consistent with federal law.42 For example, in Plyler v. Doe,43 the
Court held that a Texas statute denying funding for the public education
of undocumented alien children and permitting local districts to refuse
admission of such children to schools was invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court noted that no existing federal policy
supported Texas' decision to deny elementary education. 44 Plyler is
also significant, in so far as the state classification applied to undocumented aliens, who, unlike the legal immigrants discriminated against in
Toll and Graham, were not lawfully admitted under conditions imposed
by Congress.45
Yet even in Plyler, the Justices recognized the federal government's
responsibility to be fiscally accountable for the immigration costs that

41. Toll, 458 U.S. at 27 (citing 424 U.S. at 358).
42. Gerety, supra note 19, at 385.
43 . 457 U.S. 202,226 (1 981).
44. Id. at 225-26.
As we recognized in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the States do
have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such
action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal. In De
Canas, the State's program reflected Congress' intention to bar from
employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work
in this country. . . . In contrast, there is no indication that the disability
imposed [here] corresponds to any identifiable congressional policy. The State
does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources was ever
a congressional concern in restricting immigration.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (concluding
that state restrictions on welfare benefits for resident aliens on the basis of alienage
violated not only the Equal Protection Clause, but also constituted an "encroachment"
on federal power over lawfully admitted aliens). Interestingly, the Department of Justice
had indicated in its brief that the federal government had decided it had no interest in
the issue. Gerety, supra note 19, at 396.
45. See Plyer, 457 U. S. at 225-26.
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are concentrated in a handful of states. 46 Like the analysis in Plyler,
the discussion presented here is not intended to question the propriety of
locating control over immigration and immigrant policy with the federal
government. Nor is it intended to question Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding state alienage classifications and other immigration matters.
Rather, this discussion is simply highlighting the fact that states' hands
are tied when it comes to responding to costs imposed by illegal
immigrants. Surely, invidious discrimination by state governments
against immigrants, both legal and illegal, is inimical to the United
States' well-established commitment to immigration and immigrants, and
should be subject to close scrutiny by the courts. But even though
immigration matters may be best controlled by the federal government,
the question remains as to whether federal fiscal unaccountability for
illegal immigration has created failures in our system of governance that
the federal government has a duty to remedy. Notably, reimbursement,
one of the most obvious remedies consistent with the United States'
commitment to immigrants, does not conflict with federal plenary power
over immigration and does not require a shift in control over immigration matters. 47
III.

PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: FEDERAL ABDICATION
RUNNING AMUCK?

One of the significant consequences of federal plenary power over
immigrant benefits and services is the concomitant decrease in the states'
power to respond to state-specific economic and social issues raised by
immigrant populations. The fact that the locus of power to regulate
immigration, as well as immigrant policy, resides with the federal
government has opened opportunities for risk and cost shifting,
precipitating the breakdown of the United States' ability to absorb
immigrants successfully.
Take one current example. A number of federal welfare reform
proposals, introduced by Republicans as well as Democrats, have aimed
to eliminate, with few exceptions, immigrant eligibility for AFDC, SSI,
46. Id. at 240-241 (Powell, J., concurring) ("So long as the ease of entry remains
inviting, and the power to deport is exercised infrequently by the Federal Government,
the additional expense of admitting these children to public schools might fairly be
shared by the Federal and State governments.").
47. Reirnbursment does not implicate the concern voiced by Justice Blackmun who
joined the majority decision of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856
(1976), with the understanding that it embraced a balancing approach to state and federal
power, and did not prohibit the federal government from acting in areas where the
federal interest was clearly predominant and where state compliance with federal
standards would be critical.
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Food Stamps, or Medicaid. The Administration's own proposal seeks
to extend deeming requirements for federal programs such as SSI, Food
Stamps, and AFDC. From a state perspective, such proposals may
effectively shift costs to states which are powerless to respond.
Specifically, the effects on one state are described by State Senator
James J. Lack (R-NY):
The con game would work like this: Congress withholds federal assistance
from noncitizens, including legal immigrants and refugees, on a broad range of
programs : food stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and others. The State of New York and our
cities and counties will immediately become responsible for more than $1
billion in additional social-service costs . . . . We, the [State and local]
taxpayers ... will have to pick up the entire federal tab.48

Lack's observation is particularly troubling when one considers that most
revenues from immigrants flow to the federal treasury, but most costs
are incurred at the local level. 49
As Lack has recognized, despite the fact that most revenues from
immigrants flow to the federal treasury, the federal government has the
power to force states to absorb immigrant-related costs. Studies suggest
that, overall, immigrants contribute more in taxes than they use in
services. 50 Whether immigrants impose net costs or generate a net
surplus in public revenue varies by level of government. At the federal
level, immigrants generate a net surplus in revenue.51 The result varies
at the state level, where immigrants may generate either a net surplus cir
net cost. 52 At the local level, immigrants generate net costs, primarily
in the form of costs for educating immigrant children. 53 Simple
standards of fairness suggest that the federal government should
redistribute its net revenue suplus generated from immigrants to states
and localities that experience a net loss through no fault of their own.

48. James. J. Lack, Playing Switcheroo with Welfare, NEWSDAY, May 26, 1994,
at A7. Contrary to Lack's claim, the degree of cost shifting is unlikely to be 100% and
will depend upon the structure of individual state' s welfare programs.
49. MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION
AND IMMIGRANTS : SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, 57-62 (1994).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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A.

State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants (SL/AG)

In the immigrant context, what has been the states' experience with
Congress imposing costs and mandates without providing the money to
pay for them? Have the states been relegated to interest group status?54
As previously discussed, state initiatives to respond to immigration
issues are often unsuccessful because they are found to be inconsistent
with and preempted by federal legislation. 55 Because preemptive
federal legislation delimits states' ability to act on their own behalves,
preemptive statutes that are unwanted by the states may be viewed as
intrusive and even subversive of state governance. According to Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, protection against such
fate lies in "procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system [rather than] judicially created limitations on federal power."56
The state lawsuits seeking reimbursement for immigration costs bring
to light Congressional promulgation of legislation disparately impacting
select states. Here, structural safeguards, such as the representation of
state interests through representatives in Congress, proved insufficient to
protect against the failure of the federal government to follow through
with funds and administrative activity originally promised by and
attached to federal immigration legislation. States' experiences with
undocumented alien medical assistance requirements under the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 198657 and with State Legalization Impact
Assistance Grants (SLIAG) 58 for alien residents legalized under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) are examples of federal
legislation highly instructive on the practical politics of federalism-at
least in the immigration context.
Medicaid requirements for state medical services to undocumented
aliens illustrate the shifting of immigration costs from the federal to the
state governments. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
amended the Social Security Act to require states to provide medical
assistance to undocumented immigrants not permanently residing in the
United States under color of law (PRUCOL). Specifically, the Omnibus

54. See Robert W. Gage, Key Issues in Intergovernmental Relations in the PostReagan Era: Implications for Change, 20 AM. REV. FOR PUB. ADMIN. 155 (1990).
55. See discussion supra part II.A.
56. 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985). The Court stated: "[T]he principal means chosen
by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure
of the Federal Government itself." Id. at 550.
57. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1969 (1986) (codified as scattered sections of
the U.S. Code).
58. 8 U.S.C, § 1255a.
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 amended Medicaid to expand state
eligibility to include Medicaid payments made for the treatment of an
emergency medical condition of an undocumented alien who did not
qualify as PRUCOL. 59
The Medicaid program is a state-administered program that provides
medical services to individuals in need.60 The program is jointly
funded by federal and state governments. States must have a federally
approved state plan to receive federal reimbursement assistance for
program costs. Because the federal government has not provided full
funding for emergency medical services provided to undocumented
aliens, states have been forced to absorb much of the cost.
Like the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, the passage of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 and the
Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program increased states' fiscal
responsibility to provide for immigrants. When Congress passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, one of the key
provisions was a legalization program for immigrants who had been
living illegally in the United States.61 Similarly, under the SAW
program, undocumented aliens who established that they had worked at
least 90 days in the United States seasonal agriculture industry received
temporary, and subsequently permanent, legal status. 62 The great
majority of immigrants legalized under IRCA were barred from federal
benefits for five years, whereas immigrants legalized under SAW were
barred from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and some
select medical benefits for five years. 63
The question naturally arose as to who would pay for the government
services provided for these individuals and their families once they
ceased hiding and began using public hospitals, schools, and other
facilities. It was clear at the time that the legislation would impose
disproportionate social service costs on states such as California.
Officials for cities and counties with large immigrant populations

59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2).
60. 42 u.s.c. § 1396 (1994).
61. The other key provision established sanctions to prevent employers from hiring
illegal immigrants. CRS REP. FOR CONG, STATE LEGALIZATION IMPACT ASSISTANCE
GRANT (SLIAG) PROGRAM F'UNDING: FACTS AND ISSUES, 93-592 EPW at CRS-1 (June
17, 1993) [herinafter CRS REP. FOR CONG.].
62. Id.
63 . Id.
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successfully argued that, since immigration is a federal responsibility,
Congress should help them defray costs for the medical, welfare, and
educational costs64 of serving newly legalized residents. 65 Consequently, section 204 of IRCA, titled State Legalization Impact Assistance
Grants (SLIAG), allotted $1 billion a year for four years (FY 1988-1991)
to reimburse state and local governments. IRCA provided that SLIAG
funds were to be used to reimburse states and localities for public
assistance, public health services, and educational services for eligible
legalized aliens. The funds were to be used as well for public outreach
and education to inform temporary residents about the process of
adjusting to permanent resident status and to inform the public about
employment discrimination.66
The federal government only partly kept its promise. In 1989, Senate
and Administrative officials "raided" SLIAG funds to pay for drug
programs and health research, but promised to restore the money at a
future date. They justified the action as a use of surplus SLIAG
funds .67 In 1990 and 1991, the Bush Administration cut a total of
$1.12 billion of SLIAG funds , but failed to replace the funds in the 1992
appropriations.68 The funds were then deferred to 1993, but only

64. These costs include subsidized housing and literacy education. Associated
Press, Panel OKs Funds for Immigrants, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 2, 1992, at A3.
65 . More than half ( 1.6 million) of the 3 million immigrants who applied for
amnesty under IRCA were residents of California. Jennifer Toth, Congress OKs Big Cut
in Immigrant Aid Funds , L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1990, at A2I.
66. CRS REP. FOR CONG., supra note 61, at CRS-2.
67. Roybal: Only Part of a Very Long Tradition , L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at B6
[hereinafter Roybal]; see also CRS REP. FOR CONG., supra note 61, at CRS-3 (for a
breakdown of SLIAG funding history).
68. Roybal, supra note 67, at B6; Mary Benanti, Group Decries States · Lack of
Amnesty Funds, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 24, 1991. The San Diego Union Tribune
described SLlAG as "a slush fund for politicians' pet projects," explaining that "Rep.
Dan Rostenkowski, D-111., and White House budget director Richard Darrnan conspired
to raid SLIAG funds to finance expansion of the business school at Chicago's Loyola
Uni versity, Rostenkowski 's alma matter." The Cost of Immigration, SAN DLEGO UNION
TRIB., Nov. 27, 1991 , at B8. Some federal officials described the cuts as affecting only
surplus SLIAG funds. Jane Mason of the American Public Welfare Association
responded to this argument, stating: " In reality, there is a lag time between when the
states incur the costs and when they ask the federal government for reimbursement ....
[T]he fiscal situation is so tight on labor and health and human services subcommittees
that SLIAG competes with AIDS funding, education funding, mental health, energy
assistance." Mary Benanti, Group Decries States · Lack of Amnesty Funds, GANNET
EWS SERVICE, Sept. 24, 1994. Another commentator described "surplus" funds as
fo llows:
The so-called surplus in SLIAG existed because the funds accumulated while
the federal government has been slow in reimbursing local governments and
not because there is no demand for the money. For instance, Los Angeles
county, with the largest number of immigration amnesty applicants of any
local jurisdiction in the nation, has asked for $230 million from the federal
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$325,672,000 of the $1.12 billion was actually appropriated, with
approximately $800 million deferred until 1994.69 Thus, through the
end of the 1993 federal fiscal year, only $2. 7 billion of the original $4
billion authorized and appropriated to SLIAG had actually been allotted
to the states.70
The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act and the
authorization for SLIAG funds have the trappings of a funded mandate,
but have many of the qualities of an unfunded mandate. Together with
the amended Medicaid requirements under the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, IRCA represents an affirmative measure by the
federal government to enfranchise individuals who had either overstayed
legal visas or had illegally entered this country despite federal border
control policies in which states play almost no role. Yet, as recognized
by the SLIAG grant scheme, these federal actions had potentially
significant implications for states with large immigrant populations, such
as California.

B.

State Lawsuits for Federal Reimbursement: Demands for Change

States affected by high levels of immigration have responded to the
federal government's actions and nonfeasance in the immigration arena.
They have raised their voices against federal commandeering using a
number of means, the most visible and potentially powerful of which are
lawsuits seeking reimbursement of costs. Although a majority of the
states' lawsuits seeking reimbursement (or, in the altemati ve, an
injunction) for costs associated with undocumented aliens have been
dismissed at the initial stage, review of the lawsuits is highly useful
because they provide a summary of the rights the states believe they
possess and the obligations the states believe the federal government
owes with respect to illegal immigration.
The plaintiff states' complaints evolved in a climate of growing
demands on state officials to find a solution to a fiscal sclerosis believed

government in the current fiscal year and gotten only $28 million back so far.
San Diego County is seeking a more modest $2 million, but bas received only
$300,000.
Stealing from Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, I 989, Part II, at 6.
69. CRS REP. FOR CONG., supra note 61 , at CRS-3.
70. Id. at CRS-4.
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to result from illegal immigration, 71 and as such, reflect political
exigencies72 and paint a picture of an immigration invasion73-with
rising numbers of undocumented aliens growing out of control and
placing intolerable burdens on the states' polities. 74 Certainly the states
skewed the picture in their favor, 75 but the question remains: Do the
principles that animate the federal system demand that the federal
government reimburse the plaintiff states? The discussion of the
complaints below concentrates on select suits brought by Florida,
California, and Arizona, as these capture the main legal issues before the
courts.

1.

Overview of the States' Lawsuits

In 1994, the states of Arizona, California, Florida, as well as Texas,
New Jersey, and New York, 76 brought separate suits against the federal
government to seek reimbursement of the cost of providing federally
mandated public services, such as emergency medical services and
AFDC, for undocumented immigrants. Some also sought reimbursement
for the cost of incarcerating undocumented aliens. 77 The plaintiff states
tried to convince the courts that their claims go to the heart of the
United States federalist system---------<:asting serious, compelling doubt upon

71. Overall, illegal immigrants appear to represent a net cost to the economy. FIX
& PASSEL, supra note 49, at 70.
72. Immigration is a central issue in state political campaigns this election year and
state legislators have introduced proposals to limit state services for immigrants. See,
e.g., Gregory & Luis Wilmot, Referendum is a Poor Way to Govern, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, March 10, 1996, at 6J; Dan Morain, Assembly Panel Fails to OK State Budget,
L.A. TIMES, June I, 1995, at A3; Julia Preston, U.S. Rebuts U.N. Critics of Human
Rights Record, WASH. POST, March 30, 1995, at Al 9; David LaGesse, Discontent Grows
Toward Immigrants; Florida May Duplicate California Measure, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan.
8, 1995, at 4A.
73. See Florida Complaint at 14, Chiles v. United States, (S.D. Fla.) (No. 94-0676CIV) (filed April 11, 1994) [hereinafter Florida Complaint].
74. See e.g., id. at 3, 6.
75. For example, the Florida Complaint states that "the Federal Government is
exclusively and directly responsible for the uncontrolled influx of aliens to Florida ...."
Id. at 4. This statement is inaccurate. States have often created incentives for illegal
immigration. For instance, many employers in the plaintiff states benefit from hiring
immigrants and have formed strong lobbies to protect their interests, at the same time
creating strong economic incentives for illegal immigration. See, e.g, Latinos Divide
Over Immigration, CA. J. WKLY., Sept. 6, 1996.
76. Arizona, California, and Florida are, hereinafter, collectively referred to as the
"plaintiff states."
77. Florida seeks reimbursement only as an alternative to "an injunction directing
the defendants to cease the policies that have subjected plaintiffs to an invasion of aliens
and commandeered their legislative processes to meet the resulting costs .... " Florida
Complaint, supra note 73, at 36.
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the ability of the national political process to protect state sovereignty.78
Abuse of power easily emerges as the powerful, overarching theme of
the claims and implicates Constitutional provisions, including the Tenth
Amendment, the Guarantee Clause,79 and Article I, Section 8, Clause
180 of the of the United States Constitution, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The plaintiff states argue that
because the Supreme Court's established jurisprudence, regarding equal
protection restrictions on state alienage classifications, has left them
relatively powerless to target alien benefits, the federal government has
been able to fetter them by imposing incompletely funded mandates and
by forcing them to absorb the unavoidable costs 81 of maintaining the
state citizenry's well-being in the face of illegal immigration.
Overall, the complaints paint a picture that absolves the plaintiff states
by depicting the federal government as not only failing in its duty to

78. See e.g., California Complaint at 6, Wilson v. United States, (S.D. Cal.) (No.
940674K(CM)) (filed April 29, 1994) [hereinafter California Complaint One].
At issue is ... whether the federal government may force state governments
to implement federal policies through the disbursement of state generated tax
funds, turning the Constitution of the United States into a suicide pact for
states like California by abrogating the promise of federalism established and
promoted by that document.
Id. at 2; see also , Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 25.
The national political process has provided no adequate safeguard against this
discrimination. The costs imposed by the continuing influx of aliens on state
and local governments are disproportionately concentrated in only a few states,
including Florida. Representatives of other states have a political incentive to
ignore such costs, or to provide only small and thus far ineffective tokens of
assistance, rather than ensure that they are borne equitably.
Id. at 25-26.
79. The Guarantee Clause provides, in pertinent part: "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion .. . ." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
80. The United States Constitution, provides, in pertinent pan: "The Congress
shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States ... ."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
81 . See Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 20.
[E]ven if no legal obligation exists, as a practical matter plaintiffs have no
choice but to expend state and local government funds to support, educate,
house, care for, feed, supervise, and incarcerate many aliens who enter the
State as a result of the Federal Abdication and Default Policy, or else suffer
injury to its sovereign interests through increased crime, disease, illness,
homelessness, and the many problems presented by an uneducated or poorly
educated populace.
Id.
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prevent the entry of undocumented aliens into the United States, but also
adopting policies that encourage the influx of undocumented aliens into
their respective states. 82 Specifically, the complaints allege that the
federal government has constructively repudiated its fiscal responsibility
and rendered itself fiscally unaccountable for illegal immigration in a
number of ways: 1) By refusing to pay the full costs of alien benefits,
2) by failing to allocate total federal funds appropriated for partial alien
program funding, and 3) by delegating broad power over disbursement
of appropriated funds to administrative agencies. Failure to achieve
resolution of these claims through the political process has forced the
states to seek judicial remedy. I will address the central, non-duplicative
counts of Florida's, California's, and Arizona's complaints.
2.

Seeking to be Made Whole: Florida '.s Claims Against the
Federal Government

The state of Florida estimates that in fiscal year 1993 it spent
approximately $2.5 billion in state and local funds to provide services to
aliens. 83 Of the $2.5 billion, $884 million (a little over one third) was
estimated to flow to undocumented aliens. 84 Citing the fact that the
federal government not only has plenary power over immigration
matters, but also receives an estimated two-thirds of aliens' tax
dollars, 85 Florida contends that its "forced" outlay of funds on behalf
of aliens is "repugnant to constitutional norms of equality and fairness. "86
Florida's claim contains four separate counts against the United States:
1) Failure to develop regulations governing disbursement of the
Immigration Emergency funds, 2) failure to enforce and effectively
administer immigration laws, 3) unconstitutionality of program
restrictions, and 4) violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Guarantee
Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

82. See id. at 13. Given the concentration of immigrants within a few states,
immigration has become an increasingly localized issue. As such, one might choose to
distinguish between immigration "into respective states" and immigration into the United
States.
83. Id. at 20.
84. Id. The complaint provided a breakdown of the costs, in an attached exhibit:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING & BUDGETING,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS POLICY UNIT AND FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE UNFAIR BURDEN: IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON
FLORIDA, i, iii (March 1994).
85. Hearings Before the U.S. House Subcomm. on Human Resources (1993)
(testimony of Charles Wheeler of the National Immigration Law Center).
86. Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 6.
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Florida argues that judicial relief for counts one and three is warranted
by existing law and that judicial relief for counts two and four follows
logically from the Supreme Court's decisions in Bowen v. Massachusetts
and New York v. United States. 87

a.

Count I : Failure to Develop Regulations Governing Disbursement
of the Immigration Emergency Funds

Florida raises the issue that the Attorney General has failed to develop
the regulations necessary to disburse the "Immigration Emergency Fund"
and asks the court to review the administrative action, issue an
injunction to the Attorney General that directs her to "comply with her
duties under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 ;88 . . • develop a plan . .. for disbursement
of the Immigration Emergency Fund; [and] grant to Florida its just share
of funds." 89 As described by Florida, the "Immigration Emergency
Fund" was authorized by section 113 of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act. Section 113 amended 8 U.S .C. § 1101 to authorize an
annual appropriation sufficient to maintain a balance of $35 million in
funds (the "Immigration Emergency Fund") to be disbursed to state and
local governments incurring costs during a presidentially declared
immigration emergency. 90 Although the federal government has never

87. Bowen, 487 U.S. 879 (1988); New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Florida
Complaint, supra note 73, at 7. Florida also places general reliance on the dicta in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Plyler held that
a Texas law which withheld funding for illegal alien children and allowed districts to
deny enrollment for these children violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 230. The complaint does not focus on Plyler' s reasoning, but does
focus on the fact that five Supreme Court Justices in Plyler agreed that the federal
government should bear the cost of providing education to illegal alien children. Florida
Complaint, supra note 73 , at 7. The complaint quotes Chief Justice Burger's Plyler
dissent,in which three other Justices joined:
It does not follow ... that a state should bear the costs of educating children
whose illegal presence in this country results from the default of the political
branches of the Federal Governrnent. A state bas no power to prevent
unlawful immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens . . .. If the
Federal Governrnent, properly chargeable with deporting illegal aliens, fails to
do so, it should bear the burden of their presence here.
Id. (citing Ply ler, 457 U.S. at 242 n.l) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The complaint also
cites Justice Powell as stating "the Federal Governrnent should bear financial
responsibility for its actions." Id. (citing 457 U.S. at 241 (Powell, J. concurring)).
88. ("[A]s amended by Pub. L. 99-603, Pub. L. 101-649 and Pub. L. 102-140").
89. Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 27.
90. Id. at 24.
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formally declared an immigration emergency,91 a further amendment to
8 U.S.C. §1101, adopted in 1990, grants the Attorney General discretion
to disburse up to $20 million a year from the $35 million annual fund
without the President's declaration of an immigration emergency.92
Furthermore, other amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1101 require the Attorney
General to promulgate regulations to describe the situations that would
qualify as immigration emergencies, and to set the standards and process
for reimbursing states for costs incurred as a result of such an emergency.93
Notwithstanding the Attorney General's failure to delineate the criteria
for an immigration emergency, Florida insists that an "immigration
emergency," as defined by Public Law 99-603, has existed continuously
since at least 1986.94 Florida further argues that by failing to establish
the conditions that would constitute an immigration emergency and
failing to develop the regulations that would enable disbursement of
Immigration Emergency Funds, the Attorney General has precluded
reimbursement of states in violation of the 1990 and 1991 amendments.95 Thus, Florida alleged that, despite the authorization of the
initial appropriation of $35 million in 1986, the federal government had
saved almost $280 million by not disbursing any of the funds to Florida
or any other state.96

b.

Count 2: Failure to Enforce and Effectively
Administer Immigration Laws

The second count focuses on costs Florida has been forced to absorb
in order to preserve the public health and safety of the state. Florida
argues that the federal government has refused to accept financial
responsibility for the failure of the INS Commissioner, the Attorney
general, the INS Acting Regional Director, and the INS District Director
to enforce and administer immigration laws effectively.
Florida
describes this failure in enforcement and administration as an abuse of
discretion and "at best an arbitrary, capricious, and irrational Federal
Abdication and Default Policy" that has imposed fiscal and political

91. Id. at 26.
92. Id. at 24 (citing the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §705, 104
Stat. 5087).
93. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 102-140, Title VI, §610, 105 Stat. 832 (1991)).
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id. at 27 ("As much as $60 million could have been available to the states .. .
over the last three years.").
96. Id. at 24.
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responsibility for immigration on states like Florida. The impact on such
states disadvantages them relative to the other states:
Florida and its political subdivisions have effectively been required to pay a
grossly disproportionate share of the costs of a national problem as compared
to almost all other states, resulting in a studied inequality among the states
contrary to a fundamental premise of the United States Constitution.97

Florida claims it has no choice but to pay the costs of certain services
for undocumented aliens who were able to enter the state because the
federal government failed to enforce immigration laws. 98

c.

Count 3: Unconstitutionality of Program Restrictions

Florida currently participates in two state-federal "cooperative
programs" which serve persons in need, including some illegal as well
as legal aliens:
(a) Medicaid99- as provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1396b
and implemented under 42 C.F.R. § 435.406; and
(b) Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC"}--as provided for under 42 U.S.C. §602 and
implemented under 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.50, 233.51 , and
233.52.
Under the arrangement, Florida must contribute some state funds in
order to obtain a certain level of federal funding. 100 However, the state
cannot be reimbursed for the costs of providing services to aliens who
fall outside the restrictions of the Medicaid and AFDC statutes and
regulations.101
Florida claims that it should not be disqualified from receiving federal
funds for the amount it must spend on behalf of needy "ineligible"
aliens, because such disqualification penalizes Florida for having an alien
population. Consequently, Florida holds the position that the current
restrictions on federal funding for Medicaid and AFDC for certain

97. Id. at 29.
98. Id. at 28 (" If [Florida does] not provide such services, the State will suffer
injury through increased crime, disease, illness, homelessness, and the many problems
presented by an uneducated or poorly educated populace.").
99. The Medicaid program's purpose is to allow states to provide medical services
to individuals in need. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
I 00. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33).
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classes of aliens have no logical, rational, or constitutional basis. 102
Florida argues that the cooperative program provisions and regulations
have also enabled the United States and the HHS Secretary to commandeer the legislative process of Florida and its subdivisions and to punish
the state for conditions created by the federal government. 103
The remedy to this problem, Florida insists, is for the federal
government to provide Medicaid and AFDC funding on the same basis
other states are assisted:
Need. 104 Eligibility-but-for-alien-status
standards for federal cooperative program funding discriminate against
states like Florida for having a disproportionately large population of
aliens, in that the federal government reimburses other states for nearly
all of their expenditures for need-based medical care and AFDC.105 In
light of the circumstances described, Florida requests that the Court
declare the AFDC and Medicaid restrictions on alien coverage either
contrary to the cited statutes (in the case of regulations only) or
unconstitutional.

3.

California s Complaint Regarding Medicaid for
Undocumented Aliens

California brought three separate suits to recover the costs of illegal
immigration. They respectively seek: a) Reimbursement of approximately $400 million in annual emergency health care costs of undocumented aliens, 106 b) reimbursement for the incarceration costs for
undocumented immigrants, and c) reimbursement of the cost of
educating undocumented immigrant children. In its action regarding
Medicaid, California challenges provisions amending the Social Security
Act that require the state to expend money from its general fund to
implement federal policy to provide emergency health care to undocumented aliens. California must pay fifty percent of the costs of such
health care from its general funds .107

I 02. Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 31.
I 03. Id. at 32.
104. Id. at 31.
105. Id.
I 06. The complaint states that in fiscal year 1988-1989, the first year of
implementation, federal law mandated that California provide emergency medical
services to approximately 31,600 OBRA 86 aliens at a cost of $21 .1 million. California
asserts that because the number ofOBRA 86 aliens has "risen dramatically", the number
of OBRA 86 aliens for whom it was required to provide medical services rose to
299,900 (at a cost of $337.5 million to the State General Fund). California Complaint
at 9, Wilson v. United Sates, (C.D. Cal.) (No. 94-3561LBG) (filed May 31, 1994)
[hereinafter California Complaint Two] .
107. Id. at 2.
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a.

California Challenges Federal Requirements for State Funding of
Emergency Medical Services

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 amended the Social
Security Act to require states to provide medical assistance to undocumented immigrants not permanently residing in the United States under
color of law. 108 Specifically, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1986 amended Medicaid to expand state eligibility for select Medicaid
benefits to undocumented aliens (the complaint refers to such aliens as
"OBRA 86 Aliens"). 109 The Medicaid Program is a state-administered
program, jointly funded by federal and state governments.110 States
must have a federally approved state plan to receive federal reimbursement assistance for program costs. 111 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 was enacted in conjunction with the Immigration
Reform Control Act of 1986 (IRCA 86), which combined employer
sanctions with broad amnesty for undocumented aliens, in an effort to
"dramatically reduce the flow of undocumented aliens into the United
States." 112 California argues that the changes made by these pieces of
legislation have failed to meet their goal of reducing the flow of
undocumented aliens into the United States, but instead, have resulted

108. Id.
109. Id. The complaint cites regulations implementing OBRA 86 which are set
forth in 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.406(c) and 440.255{c). "The Administrator is charged by law
and delegation to implement and apply the provisions of 42 C.F.R. §§435.406(c) and
440.255(c) to the State of California and its State Medicaid Plan." Id. at 7-9.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2).
111. If California failed to provide emergency health care to OBRA 86 aliens,
federal financial participation in the approved medical assistance plan would cease.
California Complaint Two, supra note 106, at 12-13 (citing 42 U.S.C. §1396).
In 1988, the State of California enacted legislation, including Welfare and
Institutions Code section 14007.5 (Senate Bill 175, Stats. 1988, ch. 1441), to
authorize the State Medi-Cal Program to provide emergency health care to
OBRA 86 Aliens, as required by federal law, and such provisions, as
amended (Senate Bill 485, Stats. 1992, ch. 722) were in full force and effect
at all times relevant to the allegations set forth in this complaint. The
definition of emergency health care, as required by federal law was included
in Welfare and Institutions Code section 14007.5 as enacted by Senate Bill
175, and as amended by Senate Bill 485. References in this complaint to 'SB
175' are to chapter 1441 of the Statutes of 1988, as originally enacted and
amended by chapter 722 of the Statutes for the State of California.
Id. at 9.
112. Id. at 8.
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in substantially higher levels of illegal immigration. As a result,
federally mandated Medicaid coverage for qualified undocumented aliens
that was partly based on the expected success of !RCA sanctions will
cost the California State General Fund an estimated $1,760,971,224 by
the end of state fiscal year 1994-95. 113 Because the federal government has not provided full funding for emergency medical services
provided to undocumented aliens, California has been forced to absorb
much of the cost of an imperfect federal immigration policy.

b.

Finding Authorization for Reimbursement

California brings two separate claims-one pursuant to Public Law
103-112 and the other pursuant to Public Law 103-121. According to
the complaint, both Public Law 103-112 and Public Law l 03-121 entitle
California to full reimbursement of the amount it has spent to provide
emergency medical services to OBRA 86 aliens.

i.

Claim Pursuant to Public Law 103-112

As described by the complaint, Public Law 103-112 appropriated
funds to the Department of Health and Human Services for the 1994
federal fiscal year and portions of the federal fiscal year 1995 to support
federal financing of the Medicaid Program.114 California contends that
Public Law 103-112 appropriates funds to reimburse California for 100
percent of the cost of providing emergency medical services to OBRA
86 aliens, and has requested the Secretary of HHS (hereinafter "Secretary") and Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration

113. Id. at 10.
114. Id. at 15 (quoting Public L. No. 103-112, 107 Stat. 1982, 1905 (1993):
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
in Congress assembled, that the following sums are appropriated out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the Departments of . ..
Health and Human Services ... for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994,
and for other purposes, namely: . ..
Health Care Financing Administration
GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAID
For carrying out, except as otherwise provided, titles XI and XIX of the
Social Security Act, $64,477,413,000, to remain available until expended.
For making, after May 31, 1994, payments to States under title XIX of the
Social Security Act of the last quarter of fiscal year 1994 for unanticipated
costs, incurred for the current fiscal year, such sums as may be necessary.
For making payments to States under title XIX of the Social Security Act
for the first quarter of fiscal year 1995, $26,600,000,000 to remain available
until expended.).
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(hereinafter "Administrator") make such funds available.115 In contrast, the Secretary and Administrator (as described by the complaint)
interpret Public Law 103-112 as not affecting reimbursement for OBRA
86, which they believe is limited to the federal medical assistance
percentage dictated by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (a)(8)(B). 116
California claims that if 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) and 42 U.S.C. §1396(d),
which describe the OBRA 86 costs for which California may be
reimbursed, and 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (a)(8)(B), which provides for
determination of the federal medical assistance percentage, are construed
by the United States or any of the named defendants to prevent
reimbursement of California's total costs for providing emergency
medical services, such provisions and actions violate provisions of
Article IV, Section 4 and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. 117
Furthermore, the complaint argues that the failure of the Attorney
General, the Commissioner of INS, the Director of 0MB, the Secretary,
and the Administrator to reimburse California for its total costs
constitutes an abuse of discretion granted them by the President and
Congress to implement immigration laws and disburse funds appropriated in that regard. 118
ii.

Claim Pursuant to Public Law 103-121

California's second claim is very similar to its first in that it argues
that a federal Appropriation Act, Public Law 103-121, includes
authorization to the Attorney General to disburse funds for the purpose
of reimbursing states, such as California, for their full costs of providing
emergency care to OBRA 86 aliens. 119 Public Law 103-121 provides
an appropriation of $1,048,538,000 from the Treasury to the Attorney
115. Id. at 16 ("Appropriations to the Department [of Health and Human Services]
in the amounts set forth above include authorization to the Secretary to expend funds for
reimbursement to the State of California for those costs described in 42 U.S.C. § 1396b
and § I 396d, as set forth above.").
116. Id. at 17 ("On December 20, 1993, the Secretary, acting pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
[§] 130I(a) (8) (B), promulgated the federal medical assistance percentage applicable to
the California State Plan for medical assistance, for the 1994-95 Federal Fiscal Year, to
be 50 percent of the total amount expended by the State of California as medical
assistance under the State Plan. 58 Fed. Reg. 66863 (1993).").
117. Id.
I 18. Id. at 20.
I 19. Id. at 22 (explaining that these are the costs of implementing federal
immigration policy as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)).
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General for expenses "necessary for the administration and enforcement
of laws relating to immigration, naturalization and alien registration"
during federal fiscal year ending September 30, 1994. 120 The Attorney
General disputes California's claim, refusing to reimburse California on
the grounds that 103-121 provides no authorization for reimbursement
of states' costs for emergency medical care of OBRA 86 aliens. 121
Failure by the federal government to provide full reimbursement of
OBRA 86 alien medical assistance costs has, as described by the
complaint, harmed California in a number of ways. First, California has
been forced to pay an increasingly disproportionate cost to implement
federal immigration policy. Second, California was forced to forego
spending for other purposes. 122
This outcome resulted because
California's constitution prohibits deficit budgeting, thereby limiting the
amount of funds that may be appropriated by the State Legislature and
local legislative bodies, and limiting the amount of particular taxes that
may be raised. 123 Because California has not received relief through
the political process, the complaint seeks relief in the form of: 1) A
judgment declaring that California has the right to reimbursement of 100
percent of its expenditures for emergency medical services for OBRA 86
aliens (made pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1396b(v)) from appropriations
made to the Attorney General and Secretary of HHS by Public Law 103121; 2) an injunction requiring the Attorney General, Secretary of HHS,
and Director of 0MB to make such a disbursement; and 3) a judgment
that any federal law that prevents the reimbursement of California's costs

120. Id. at 21-22.
121. /d.at22.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id. at 18-19. The complaint describes the federal government's demands on
California general funds as impinging on California's ability to exercise its sovereignty:
In California, the budget is the single most important policy document
undertaken by government . . . . The United States has, by failing to
reimburse the State of California the full cost of providing emergency health
care to OBRA 86 Aliens, and by enacting other laws or implementing other
policies claimed by it to limit the right of the State of California to such
reimbursement, required that State taxes be raised, that State funds be
expended, that State statutes be enacted and implemented-all to further the
interests of the United States and the immigration policies adopted by it. By
its immigration policy and the requirement to provide emergency health care
to OBRA 86 Aliens, the United States and defendants have prevented the State
of California from exercising its sovereign right to expend funds to further the
polices and interests of its citizens as determined by the people of the State of
California and their elected representatives, acting pursuant to the California
Constitution.
Id. at 19.
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in question is void and in conflict with Article 4, Section 4 and the 10th
Amendment of the United States. 124
4.

Reimbursement of Undocumented Alien Incarceration Costs:
Arizona and California
a. Incarceration in Arizona

Arizona invokes the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure
Act in bringing a claim against the federal government for reimbursement of costs incurred for the imprisonment of undocumented aliens
convicted of a felony in Arizona. The complaint contends that Arizona
is entitled to such reimbursement pursuant to the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986, which requires the Attorney General to
reimburse states for such costs and authorizes the appropriation of funds
for such reimbursement. 125 The complaint quotes the following
provisions of the Act:
(a) Subject to the amounts provided in advance in appropriation Acts, the
Attorney General shall reimburse a State for costs incurred by the State for the
imprisonment of any illegal alien or Cuban national who is convicted of a
felony by such a State.
(b) There are authorized to be ap~ropriated such sums as are necessary to carry
out the purposes of this section. 6

Like the California complaint that seeks reimbursement of emergency
medical service costs for OBRA 86 aliens, Arizona invokes Public Law
103-121, which provides an appropriation (in the amount of
$1,048,538,000) for expenses incurred in administering and enforcing
immigration, naturalization, and alien registration laws during the fiscal
year ending September 30, 1994. 127 In addition, the complaint cites
an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act which permits
increased fines and forfeitures for immigration laws to be used to

124. Id. at 23, 24.
125. Arizona Complaint at 14, Symington v. United States (D. Az.) (No. 94-0866)
(filed May 2, 1994) [hereinafter Arizona Complaint] (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a), 100 Stat.
3443. , Pub. L. 99-603 and 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b)).
126. Id. (quoting the Immigration and Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 365(b)
(1986)).
127. Id. at 6 (citing U.S.C., Congressional & Administration News, 103rd Congress,
1st Session, Public Law 103-121, 07 Stat. 1153, 1160).
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enhance "the enforcement of the immigration laws, including the
identification, investigation, and apprehension of criminal aliens." 128
According to the complaint, incarceration expenditures by Arizona,
which are not otherwise provided for, are incurred in administering and
enforcing laws pertaining to immigration, naturalization, and alien
registration, as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 129 Arizona
contends that the appropriation under Public Law 103-121, and any
additional funds made available through 8 U.S.C. ~ 1330, cover
incarceration costs described by the Immigration Reform and Control
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and therefore, seeks reimbursement pursuant to
the appropriations.130 Arizona asserts that failure to make such
appropriations constitutes an abuse by the Attorney General, the
Commissioner of INS, and the Director of 0MB of discretion granted
them by the President. 131
Arizona's State Department of Corrections and the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have estimated that almost
ten percent (1,760) of Arizona's total inmate population (17,968) met the
definition of "illegal alien," as provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and
thereby, are subject to deportation. 132 Given an annual incarceration
cost of approximately $15,773 per inmate, Arizona estimates that it has
spent approximately $25 million for the incarceration of undocumented
aliens. 133 Also, Arizona has a constitutional provision, similar to that
of California's, that places a debt limitation on expenditures by the state
legislature. 134 Limits on deficit spending have forced the Arizona state
legislature to forego some appropriations on behalf of its legal residents
because the state tax income goes to incarcerating and paroling
undocumented aliens. 135

128. Id. at 7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1330(b), 104 Stat. 5057, Pub. L. 101-649).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id.at?.
134. Id. at 11 (citing ARiz. CONST. art. 9, § 5).
135. Like the other states, Arizona argues that its failure to find a political remedy
requires the Court to issue: I) A judgment declaring that Arizona is entitled to
reimbursement for the cost of incarcerating undocumented aliens pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) "from any appropriation to the Department of Justice for the administration
and enforcement of laws relating to immigration, naturalization and alien registration,
including Public Law 103-121 , funds made available pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1330, and
funds appropriated for those purposes by Congress in any subsequent fiscal year"; 2) a
permanent injunction requiring the Attorney General, INS Commissioner, and the
Director of 0MB to make such reimbursement pursuant to Arizona; 3) a judgment
declaring that any law enacted which prevents reimbursement of Arizona's costs for
incarcerating undocumented aliens is void and in conflict with Article IV, Section 4 and
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b.

California s Complaint for Reimbursement of Undocumented
Alien Incarceration Costs

As in the case of Arizona, California's case challenges the federal
government's failure to reimburse the State of California for the cost of
incarcerating undocumented immigrants. 136 The claims and relief
sought on the issue of reimbursement for incarceration costs are nearly
identical to their counterparts in the Arizona complaint. 137 Probably
the most interesting aspect of this case is its request for a judgment
declaring that the Attorney General, the Commissioner of INS, and
federal employees under their direction have an administrative duty,
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Immigration
Reform and Control Act, to deport persons convicted of deportable
offenses (under these Acts) as well as prosecute persons who return to
California in violation of any deportation order. 138 The complaint
seeks an injunction mandating the defendants' compliance with such
duties. Further, it seeks that any law that prevents defendants from
performing the duties in question be found to violate Article IV, Section
4 of the Constition and the Tenth Amendment. 139
According to the complaint, federal law requires that the INS begin
deportation proceedings "as expeditiously as possible" after the
conviction of an alien eligible for deportation.14° California contends

the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; 4) a permanent injunction
prohibiting the Attorney General, INS Commissioner, and 0MB Director from applying
any federal law that would prevent reimbursement for the costs of incarcerating
undocumented aliens. Id. at 16.
136. In contrast to the Arizona case, incarceration costs include prison construction
necessary to house alien felons and parole supervision for illegal aliens not deported.
California Complaint One, supra note 78, at 6.
137. It bears noting that during California fiscal years spanning between 1991-92
and 1993-94, California experienced a "financial crisis" and found it necessary to issue
Revenue Anticipation Warrants and registered warrants to meet the state's financial
obligations. Id. at 13.
138. Id. at 5 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326).
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 16. "[I]n the case of an alien who is convicted of an offense which
makes the alien subject to deportation, the Attorney General shall begin any deportation
proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of conviction." Id. (emphasisis
added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i)). It appears that Congress intended deportation
proceedings to begin at the time of conviction, not release. 132 CONG. REC. H9785-0l
(Oct. 9, 1986).
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that the intent behind expediting deportation proceedings was to
minimize the cost that states would have to absorb for incarcerating
convicted undocumented aliens and to reduce state prison overcrowding.
As described by the California complaint, INS currently follows a policy
under which interviews and processing of incarcerated aliens subject to
deportation are prioritized according to the "most imminent release
date," notwithstanding the alien's actual date of conviction and
incarceration. 141 California maintains that the failure of the Commissioner of the INS to implement the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i)
constitutes an abuse of her delegated discretion, and requests that the
Court issue an injunction pursuant to a declaration that under 8 U.S.C.
1252 (i), which states the defendant has a duty to begin deportation
proceedings as soon as possible after the date of conviction. 142
The complaint also raises the claim that the Attorney General and INS
Commissioner have failed in their duty under 8 U .S.C. § 1252 to take
custody of inmates who are released from confinement and eligible for
deportation. 143 California argues that failure to take custody is an
abuse of authority which has imposed security and medical costs on
California.
Accordingly, the state seeks a judgment recognizing
defendants' custodial duty and an injunction compelling them to comply
with it. Finally, California brings a claim to require the Attorney
General to adopt an effective enforcement policy when administering 8
U.S.C. § 1326, which subjects alien felons re-entering the United States
to federal imprisonment for a maximum of 2 to 15 years upon conviction. 144 The complaint contends that California has experienced an
illegal alien inmate return rate of 37%--which California attributes
largely to the failure of the Attorney General to prosecute under 8
U.S .C. § 1326 undocumented aliens who illegally re-enter after formal
deportation. As a remedy, California seeks a judicial declaration that the
Attorney General has a duty to prosecute under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and a
duty to expend appropriate funds for this purpose, or in the alternative,
reimburse California for its actions enforcing federal immigration policy.
The fifth and final claim seeks a declaration and injunction by the court
that would establish a mandate that the Attorney General and Commis-

141. California Complaint One, supra note 78, at 17. The complaint also states that
California officials believes that " INS/Border Patrol agents are not interviewing inmates
that have six or more months left to serve on their state prison terms." Id. The upshot
of such a policy is that INS is able to lower or minimize its spending on deportation
proceedings by shifting the costs, in the form of increased incarceration periods, to
California.
142. Id. at 19.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 22-23 .
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sioner execute all final orders of deportation (pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(c)) by removing a deportee to a location in the "country of origin
most likely not to result in re-entry." 145

IV.

A.

THE POLITICAL REALITY OF COST SHIFTING

Back-Door Mandates: Imposing Costs Indirectly

On the surface, the states' complaints all appear to implicate federal
unfunded mandates-costs that were unavoidable, imposed by the federal
government, and that used funds that would otherwise have gone to
programs directed at legal residents. However, unlike federal mandates,
the state money was not spent pursuant to a constitutional, statutory, or
administrative requirement, nor could it be described as the difference
between the amount a state government would spend on an activity
absent a federal mandate and what it is required to spend by the
Although there existed no explicit federal directive
mandate. 146
requiring states to provide costly services, the expenditures arguably
were created by the nonfeasance of the federal government as well as
state reliance on federal reimbursement for select expenses 147 on behalf
of undocumented immigrants--a form of "back-door" unfunded
mandating. The states expended the money out of perceived necessity;
because the federal government failed to handle illegal immigration
matters successfully and refused to allocate appropriated funds, they
were left with little choice but to absorb costs for programs and services
necessary to protect the general state welfare. Given the fiscal impact
of compounded backdoor mandating of this kind, it is hardly surprising

145. Id. at 33.
146. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 152. " Unfunded mandate" has become a
political catch-term, which the general public applies to everything from grants-in-aid
to statutorily defined national criteria/standards to any form of national regulation that
imposes costs on states. See e.g., Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, House Rules Comm.
Hearing, Unfunded Mandates, Jan. 11, 1995 (testimony of Sen. St. George, Assistant
Director State Fiscal Project Center on Budget and Policy Priorities). As described by
Congressman Gary Condit (D-Cal), the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported that "over
1,000 local officials around the Nation held events in which they singled out unfunded
Federal mandates as the biggest problem they face." Rep. Paul Gillmor & Fred Eames,
Reconstruction of Federalism : A Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded
Mandates, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395,397 n.10 (1994) (citing 139 CONG. REC. H8568
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993)).
147. See supra part III.B.2.a. for a discussion about immigration emergency funds.
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that the states describe the government as "commandeering" their
legislative processes. 148

B.

Possibility of Political Remedy

Another notable feature of the much publicized states' lawsuits is their
function as a sword in the battle over control and accountability of
illegal immigration. The suits ostensibly seek judicial remedy, but the
high probability that the courts would eventually find the cases
nonjusticiable and dismiss (as they already have for many) suggests that
the suits may really be a maieutic agent in the struggle for voluntary
political remedy by the federal government.149 Viewed within the
framework of an organizational paradigm of federal-state dynamics
known as the "dialectical" model, 150 seeking increased federal accountability through high-profile lawsuits is a logical step to changing the
federal-state order in the immigration sphere. The dialectical model
predicts that the opportunity for reform will arise when tensions in the
inter-organizational, political, and administrative system can no longer
be suppressed, and that at such time a rival organizational paradigm will
emerge. 151 Applying the model to the immigration context, does it
appear that a new organizational paradigm will prevail? If recent

148. For a discussion of the effects of unfunded mandates on states generally, see
Gillmor & Eames, supra note 146.
149. The federal government bas taken some action to respond to concerns
regarding state costs of immigration. For example, the 1994 Crime Law expedited
deportation of criminal aliens, expanded categories of crimes for which criminal aliens
could be deported, and, most importantly, provided a $1.8 billion reimbursement to states
for the costs of incarcerating illegal criminal aliens. Katharine Q. Seelve, Anti-Crime
Bill as Political Dispute: President and G.O.P. Define the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1995, at Al6. However, it remains to be seen how much of this $1.8 billion actually
reaches the states. As far as education and medical services are concerned, President
Clinton's 1996 budget authorized $100 million for educational assistance for both legal
and illegal immigrants, and $150 million to subsidize the state costs of providing
emergency medical care to illegal immigrants. Hearings Before the U.S. H.R. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims (Apr. 5, 1995) (testimony of
Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel of The Urban Institute).
150. Arthur Benz, Regionalization and Decentralization, in FEDERALISM AND THE
ROLE OF THE STATE 127, 130 (Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler eds., 1987)
[hereinafter ROLE OF THE STA TE].
151. Id. at 131. Other theories explaining the impetus of change exist. For
example, Herman Bakvis and William Chandler predict that "outside forces such as those
stemming from changes in the international economy may reduce the resources available
to one or more governmental units or interest groups", which would spur a demand for
change in the federal-state relationship. Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler, The
Future of Federalism, in ROLE OF THE STATE, supra note 150, at 314. They describe
another source for demands for change as the federal relationship itself, which
"generate[s] within itself those features that sooner or later will result in alteration of that
relation." Id.
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political circumstances are any indicator, it seems it may. 152 But the
solution will come only after the states have absorbed significant costs.
Moreover, political solutions may not prevent further metastasizing of
federal abdication. Such possible outcomes suggest that political
solutions may be neither a sufficient nor a reliable bulwark against
failures in the federal system.
C.

Interstate Redistribution: The Economic
Incentives of Undersupply

Division of power between the state and federal governments fosters
efficiency of governance. Efficient distribution of power means that the
federal government is not only responsible for harmonizing and unifying
policy regarding foreign and interstate relations-------policies that affect the
entire country proportionally, but is also responsible for establishing
programs and providing national public goods such as national defense-goods that would be underproduced if left to the individual
states. Such goods which are better left under the control of the federal
government may be termed "national public goods." Likewise,
production of public goods that affect only one level of society are
properly left to the more localized governments of the states and cities
that contain those sectors affected. Such goods may be termed "local
public goods."
Allowing state and local governments to provide local public goods
enables those people who are affected to decide whether program
benefits exceed the costs. Different communities will then provide
different combinations of goods that cater to their respective citizenries.153 Theoretically, when the effects of localized goods are concentrated within the sphere of the state or local government providing them,
aggregate utility should be greater than if the national government were
responsible for providing the goods uniformly throughout the country.154 Programs and services dealing with illegal immigration and

152. This effort is already seeing political results. See supra note 149.
153. Assuming that perfect mobility exists, people will move to those areas that
provides a mix of goods that best satisfies their demands. See PAUL E. PETERSON ET
AL. , WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS (1986).
154. Id. at 11 ("Playgrounds can be concentrated where young children are
abundant; recreation halls for senior citizens can be clustered in adult communities; parks
can be maintained at varying levels of care, depending on local aesthetic tastes.").
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illegal immigrants fall somewhere between pure national public goods
and pure state public goods. Accordingly, some public expenditures
targeting illegal immigration and services for illegal immigrants are
funded by national taxes, while others rely upon state and local
resources.
Redistribution of resources necessary to respond to illegal immigration
will be of a territorial and social variety-entailing the transfer of
resources among states as well as the transfer of resources from
American citizens to immigrants who are residing in the United States
without the consent of the U.S . government. 155 Citizens in states with
high undocumented immigrant populations may believe that the interest
in preserving the state's general welfare and meeting basic standards of
human decency mediate in favor of making available to illegal immigrants a minimal level of public services and benefits, such as medical
assistance. At the same time, individual states that experience high
levels of illegal immigration may be disinclined to provide services or
public benefits to illegal immigrants. Immigration states may fear that,
by redistributing state resources to illegal immigrants, they will increase
the incentive for illegal immigrants to locate in their states. Furthermore, states with relatively few illegal immigrants would incur both the
direct and externality benefits of the immigration states' socially
redistributive policies benefiting illegal immigrants; the direct benefits
would be the avoidance of costs that might be distributed nationally, and
the externality benefits would take the form of enhanced national
welfare.

155. Because of the importance people may place on citizenship, social redistribution to non-citizens may be particularly difficult to achieve. See PETER H. SCHUCK &
ROGERS M . SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT 99 (I 985) (arguing that "the
essence of consensual political identity" is the notion of "us" versus "them," which then
explains the desire to preserve resources for those who belong to "us."); see also Linda
S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker
Under United States Law, WIS. L. REV. 955, 961 (1988).
Social relations in most communities can be viewed, in abstract terms, as
being comprised of rules and practices that constitute community membership
at two distinct, though related, levels. The concern at the first level is with
who is in and who is out - with determining the subjects of community
membership. At the second level, the focus is on the nature of the relationships between those people acknowledged to be members - on establishing
the meaning or substance of the membership.
Id.; Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV.
I, 3 (1988) ("Among full members of the community, the ideal of equality prevails; as
to outsiders, the issue of equality seems irrelevant. Equality and belonging are
inseparably linked. To define the scope of the ideal of equality in America is to define
the boundaries of the national community.").
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Because of the collective action problems raised by the territorial and
social redistribution of both resources and services, national government
is in many ways best suited to assume responsibility for providing
services and goods. 156 Unfortunately, centralized provision of public
goods and services creates a disjunction between those who make
decisions as to how to meet national objectives and those who pay the
bills. This disjunction characterizes much of immigration and immigrant
policy, as illustrated by the Refugee Act of 1980. In many ways,
Congress has acceded to the Executive's willingness to admit refugees
at record levels, while neither branch related refugee flow to overall
migration levels. 157 Policymakers regarded difficulties as local problems unconnected to unregulated immigration from Mexico, which itself
was considered a local problem. A handful of states were thus left with
increased costs for welfare and social services, a situation that has fueled
local resentment and fostered continued refugee backlash.
To the extent that particular benefits of the federal system are
decentralized, diseconomies arise which promote the undersupply of
public goods that have interregional spillovers. What one state gains
through redistribution is perceived as a loss by other states. Thus, the
federal government operates under the pressure of assuaging states that
experience (or simply perceive) national encroachments on their power
and that are angered by actual and anticipated loss of resources. 158

156. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 17 (noting that the federal
government will be best positioned to assume responsibility for redistribution when it
"takes the form of a cash award based on some fairly well defined criteria," but that
when "commodities are to be distributed or services are to be performed----housing,
education, medical care, food, legal assistance, or social services --the administrative
complexity of the redistributive program may call for participation and cooperation by
local governments.").
157. John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36
U. MIAMI L. REV. 819,855 (1982) (discussing the impact of the Refugee Act of 1980).
The author makes the related point that immigration issues should sometimes be viewed
as local. With reference to Texas' refusal to apportion state aid to educate undocumented immigrants, he argues:
[I]n Texas, regional economic interests have been largely responsible for a
federal border policy that has consistently encouraged ' back door' migration.
The benefits of this policy have accrued largely to that state; therefore, it
seems fair that Texas should bear the reasonable educational costs that are
incidental to these benefits.
Id. at 861-62.
158. See William M. Chandler, Federalism and Political Parties, in ROLE OF THE
STATE, supra note 150, at 164 (discussing the ability of national political parties to
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Redistribution of resources from non-immigration to immigration
states underscores the conflicts of interest among states. Although
mutuality of states' interests underlies immigration policy, there exists
a strong incentive for the national government to fund programs and
services related to illegal immigration below the efficient level. Of
course, the idea behind redistribution is that, as members of the larger
nation, states should experience extemality benefits from national
programs that bring gains to other states.
Even so, national
decisionmakers will undervalue the benefits because they will discount
the benefit of the extemality by the probability that the states which are
not directly consuming will actually perceive the externality benefits. 159
If the problem is viewed as localized and no extemality benefits are
perceived by other states, or if such benefits are de minimus, the
undervaluation may be significant.
V.

THE GOVERNMENT AS THE PEOPLE: A TRUST MODEL ANALYSIS
OF FEDERAL DUTIES

A.

The Complexity of Bringing Order to Federalism

As discussed earlier, the states' complaints regarding the federal
government's role in formulating, implementing, and funding policy
concerning illegal immigration are largely complaints about our system
of federalism. Appropriately, analysis and evaluation of the states'
claims should take place from such a perspective. In order to answer the
question of whether the states have made a claim for which the
American system of federalism demands remedy, we must first analyze
the relevant positive rights created on behalf of states under the
Constitution. Second, we must examine the nature of federal duties
arising by virtue of such positive rights. Unfortunately, the task is
formidable. Federalism remains a structural farrago, not readily
amenable to coherent understanding.
The central constitutional
protections for state rights, the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee
Clause, lacking as they are in content, have become creatures of
interpretation. Every stroke of the academic's pencil has left the veneer

"serve as integrative mechanisms, which through formal and informal ties can prevent
regional parties from neglecting the interests of those outside their own jurisdiction").
159. Distributional coalitions may form as a partial remedy to the mismatch between
the costs and benefits of public goods. The effect of such coalitions will be a function
of their interests and relative bargaining power. See Bakvis & Chandler, supra note 151,
at 313. Bakvis and Chandler describe distributional coalitions as seeking benefits for the
members at a cost to the larger community. Id. The existence of such coalitions is
explained by economic self-interest. Id.
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of federalism riddled with streaks. One commentator captured the
central problem of scholars' attempts to bring order to federal-state
dynamics, describing the analysis as "typically a set of imprecise images
that dramatize the chaos, disorder, and lack of controlled purpose said
to characterize the current system." 160 Eschewing the classic conundrum for workable principles of federalism, as they pertain to fiscal
responsibilities, requires a morphologic approach to a theory of states'
positive rights.
The steady growth of constitutionally sanctioned federal power over
a veritable bevy of economic and social issues since the time of the New
Deal brought with it a concomitant shrinkage in state autonomy as well
as confusion about the meaning of federalism in the United States. 161
Many critics of federalism, such as William Riker, applauded such
development as a proper move against "at best . . . a confusion of
contradictory policies, and at worst as a tyranny by minority and
'impediment to the freedom of all. "' 162 For those such as Riker, who
view a federally-dominated system of government as more efficient and
democratic than a state-dominated republic, I ask the question: does the
dissonance between federal plenary power over immigrants and the state
provision of welfare and services for immigrants not create substantial
inefficiencies that deserve correction? If so, how strongly does an
efficiency argument hold up against challenges? Beyond the normative
questions, do states' rights embodied in the Constitution carry an

160. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 217 (citing Thomas J. Anton, intergovernmental Change in the United States: An Assessment of the Literature, in PUBLIC
SECTOR PERFORMANCE: A CONCEPTUAL TuRNING POINT 22 (Trudi C. Miller ed. ,
1984)). Peterson goes on to quote Anton' s findings on characterizations of American
federalism : "[T]he federal system has been described as 'out of control, ' 'dangerously
dysfunctional,' 'a Leviathan run amuck,' ' ungovernable,' largely ' uncontrolled and
unaccountable,' and suffering from a 'centralization maelstrom."' Id.
161. ld. at5.
But because of a series of New Deal Supreme Court decisions that whittled
away the exclusive powers of the states and gave Congress the authority to act
in virtually all areas of economic and social life, this doctrine became
moribund, and the scholarship on federalism became as confused, ad hoc, and
inchoate as federal policy itself.
Id. In moving from an analysis of what powers properly belong in the federal and state
spheres respectively to an analysis of what responsibilities accompany the shift or
amalgamation of power, we may be able to circumvent some of the conceptual problems
that have faced the academics described by Peterson.
162. Thomas 0. Hueglin, Legitimacy, Democracy, and Federalism, in ROLE OF THE
STATE, supra note 150, at 34.
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accompanying command to remedy fiscal inefficiencies? I argue that the
Constitution established a trust relationship between the states and the
federal government and that the nature of this relationship dictates that
the federal government be more accountable to the states. Admittedly,
a damage action may not be a practical remedial dimension of the
Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment, and may thus call for the
Supreme Court to render a simple declaration that a particular action of
the federal government has violated either or both of these clauses.

B.

Duality of Trusts: A Framework for Analysis

An oft-neglected touchstone of our federal system of government is
that the federal government is a fiduciary entrusted with confidence and
owing the highest duty to act in good faith for the benefit of its citizens.
No concept is more closely associated with fiduciary relationships than
that of the trust, a type of fiduciary relationship which involves a trustee
who holds legal title subject to the rights of beneficiaries. 163 The
fiduciary relationship is created by a party called the settlor, who puts
her property in the trust. The trustee then manages that property for the
purpose of benefiting a beneficiary. The most common form of trust, an
express trust, is created expressly by the settlor and must possess the
following elements: A trustee who has consented to the relationship,
property managed by the trustee (res), 164 and beneficiaries who may
include the trustee or the settlor. The word "trust" need not appear in
an express trust, as evidence of the settlor's intention to create such a
relationship suffices. In the case of federalism, evidence of the
settlement of the governmental trust may be adduced from the history of
the Constitutional Convention.
C.

Locke s Vision of Government as Trustee

American federalism, the principle of sharing power between the states
and federal government, is the product of a constitutional compromise
between those championing a strong central government and those
preferring the looser bonds of the confederation. 165 Since the framing
of the Constitution, the United States has seen a significant evolution in
both the immigration and federalism issues to which the Constitution is

163. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES, chs. 1-3 (3d ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
164. "Property," for purposes of trust, may consist of anything recognized by the
law as such. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 74b (1959).
165. See e.g., Arnold I. Burns, The Perspective of Federalism at the United States
Department of Justice in 1987, in FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at 45.
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applied. Historical and political changes notwithstanding, I use induction
from historical fact to show that our governmental system is one based
on trust, with certain duties inhering in powers granted and exercised.
The notion that the formativeJ'rocess of government bears analogy
to a trust model is not novel.'
However, past discussions of the
government trust have focused on the duties and obligations of the
federal and state governments to the people and have neglected to use
the trust framework to analyze the respective rights and obligations that
arise between the federal and state governments themselves. 167
Although the theory of government as trustee for the people did not gain
widespread attention until it was applied by John Locke-undoubtedly
the most famous advocate of the extended trust metaphor for civil
governance--the idea was discussed as far back as the early seventeenth
century. 168 American adoption of the trust doctrine can be traced back
to the ideas and writings of Locke. Locke bad a large influence on the
creation of the American government, beginning with the Declaration of
Independence, when his "impact [was] unmistakable," 169 and continuing through the period of constitutional construction, when his theories
shaped the federal paradigm. 170 Locke believed that government was
the product of a contract among people, that legislators were trustees for
the public good of the people--trustees who could be impeached if they
breached the trust. 171 For Locke, the formative process of civil

166. John Locke was one of the earliest advocates of the trust model of
gonvemance. See Donald L. Doemberg, " We the People ": John Locke, Collective
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REv.
52, 61 n.50 (1985) (citing J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 156 (2d ed.
1973)).
167. See, e.g, J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154-192 (2d ed.
1973); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE, 376-381 (P.
Laslett ed. 1960).
168. Doemberg, supra note 166, at 61 n. 50.
169. Id. at 64 (citing E. DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 20, 42 (1950) and A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 90 ( 1948)).
170. "Professor G. Mace notes, 'Locke has long been considered the political
theorist who exerted the greatest influence upon our national-rights heritage . . . . Many
go so far as to suggest his influence upon the American Funding Fathers was so great
that the United States may be termed a Lockean nation."' Id. at 58 n.36 (citing G.
MACE, LOCKE, HOBBES, AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 9 (1979)).
171. Id. at 64. However, "[s]everal writers suggest that Locke's repeated resort to
the trust metaphor should not be taken to connote a trust in a literal or formal sense."
Id. at 62 (citing J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE' S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 175-78 (2d ed. 1973)
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government, where the people served simultaneously as the settlors and
beneficiaries, underpinned the trust relationship. 172

D.

The Question of Sovereignty: The Founders' Envisionment of
Federal-State Roles Under the Constitution

State delegates attending the Constitutional Convention of 1787
(Convention) faced the formidable task of crafting a new system of
federal governance. The Convention marked an ideological departure
from the principles that animated the Articles of Confederation, the
American people's failed attempt to create a federation of states. Driving
forces behind the Convention included the delegates' desire to correct
abusive state behavior engendered under the Articles of Confederation.
Such state abuses were thought by many to impinge on individual
rights, 173 and two prevailing bodies of thought, Federalist and
Antifederalist, endeavored to find a solution to the problem.
The Antifederalists feared the loss of control that they believed would
accompany concentration of power at the national level. 174 As described by Gordon Wood:
[T)he Antifederalists' lack of faith was not in the people themselves, but only
in the organizations and institutions that presumed to speak for the people ... .
They were 'localists,' fearful of distant governmental, even representational,
authority for very significant political and social reasons that in the final
analysis must be called democratic . . . . The Antifederalists saw themselves
in 1787-88 fighting the good old Whig cause in defense of the people's liberties
against the engrossing power of their rulers. 175

Like the Whigs, the Antifederalists feared the dichotomy between
national interests and state interests. Federalists, on the other hand,
advocated a strong national government. They sought to empower
national government as a remedy to the failing of the Articles. Some
Federalists, such as Edmund Randolph, the author of the Virginia plan,

and J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT SECOND TREATISE 112 (P. Laslett, ed.
I 960)).
172. Id. at 61.
173. For example, Madison argued that "[t]he rights of individuals are infringed by
many of the state laws---such as issuing paper money, and instituting a mode to
discharge debts differing from the form of the contract." Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1440 n.60 (1987) (citing I THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318-319 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937).
Amar describes the Federalists view of the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 1440-42.
174. GoRDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787
521 {1969) (citation omitted).
175. Id. at 520-21.
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even wanted to go so far as to create "a strong consolidated union, in
which the idea of states should be nearly annihilated." 176
The Anti federalists' fear that a strong national government would
subsume state govemments 177 held significant ramifications for the
Federalists in framing the Constitution, for they knew that if people
believed the Constitution would eventually destroy the states and
produce a consolidation, it would never be adopted. 178
Consequently, in their constitutional debates, both the Federalists and
Ant ifederalists came to focus on the question of the power to be reserved
to the states. 179 To respond to the Antifederalists' concern about state
power, the Federalists posited a number of explanations of how the
proposed constitutional system would protect against unbridled
aggrandization of national power at the cost of state independence.
These explanations covered a broad range. Some emphasized the fact
that "the new government in many of its provisions was so 'dependent
on the constitution of the state le~islatures for its existence' that it could
never 'swallow up its parts. "' 18 Others argued that "each state was
only 'giving up a portion of its sovereignty' in order 'better to secure the
remainder of it. "' 181 Some felt there were "two governments to which
[people] . . . owe[d] obedience," 182 while still others argued that "'[t]he
sphere in which the states moved was of a different nature' from that of
the federal government." 183 The controversy did not end there. Some
felt that the Constitution was "not completely consolidated, nor [was] it

176. Id. at 525 (quoting Edmund Randolph's description of his proposed Virginia
Plan).
177. Anti federalists argued that the supremacy of federal government would
'" eventually annihilate the independent sovereignties of the several states."' Id. at 528
(citation omitted).
178. Id. at 528-29.
179. Id. at 529.
I 80. Id. (citation omitted).
I 8 I. Id. ( citation omitted).
182. Id. (citation omitted).
183. Id. (citation omitted). Wood quotes Edmund Pendleton as arguing that
[t]he two governments act in different manners, and for different purposes . . .
the general government in great national concerns, in which we are interested
in common with other members of the Union; the state legislature in our mere
local concerns . ... They can no more clash than two parallel lines can meet.
Id.
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entirely federal," 184 and others believed that sovereignty "reside[d] in
the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government." 185
Ultimately, the argument that supreme sovereignty resided in the
people and that state governments would be protected as long as the
sovereign people so deemed won the battle for the Federalists.
According to this argument, the people "only dispensed such portions of
power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare" and could
"delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such terms, and
under such limitations, as they think proper." 186 As the genuine
sovereign, the people were the source of ultimate, preeminent authority.
Thus, the people could "take from the subordinate government's powers
with which they have hitherto trusted them, and place these powers in
the general government." 187 How the powers were to be distributed
between the state and federal governments was a choice to be left to the
people who could "distribute one portion of power to the more
contracted circle called State governments [and] furnish another
proportion to the government of the United States." 188 Under this
framework, the state and national governments were to serve the people.
VI.

A PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAME: GOVERNMENT TRUSTEES

Although the Framers did not expressly describe government as being
based on a trust model, the formative process of governance under the
Constitution is infused with the spirit of Lockean trusteeship. The trust
analogy applies to the relationship between the states and their citizenry
as well as the relationship between the federal government and the
people of the nation. Collectively, the states of the union acted as settlor
of the trust between the people of the nation and the national government. At the time of constitutional construction, the states respectively
served as trustee for the interests of their local citizenry. Both before
and after the drafting of the constitution the states were vested with
"numerous and indefinite" police powers over the affairs of state
citizens. 189 Such powers "extend[ed] to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern[ed] the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the

184. Id. (quoting James Madison).
185. Id. at 530 (quoting James Wilson).
186. Id. (quoting James Wilson).
187. Id. (quoting James Wilson).
188. Id. at 530-31 (quoting James Wilson).
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (New American Library,
1968) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 45]; see ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 25.
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State." 190 Yet, such power was not to be used in any manner the state
chose, but rather, to further the interests of the citizen beneficiaries. 191
The states owed the highest duty of good faith to their citizens, and this
explains why, at the time of constitutional construction, concerns about
preserving state and local interests were foremost on the Founders'
minds (see Table 1 on following page).
The federal and state governments were to assume the responsibilities
of trustees acting on behalf of the people. As the beneficiaries of the
trust relationship, the people retained the power to control state and
national governments directly through elected representatives and
indirectly through the threat of revocation or alteration of delegated
power. 192 And in the capacity of trustee, the state and federal governments were respectively endowed with the power to compel action and
compliance by the sovereign people.
Under the structural setup, government was required to act within its
delegated power. 193 Such delimitation of power was crucial to the
two-tiered protection provided by the co-existing national and state
trusts:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against
by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. 194

The state and national governments were duty-bound to the people, who
could be considered the settlor of the state and national trusts. 195 For

190. FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 189, at 292-93.
191. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 25.
192. Doemberg points to judicial review as an additional source of governmental
accountability. Doemberg, supra note 166, at 67
193. As described by Akhil Amar, "government entities were sovereign only in a
limited and derivative sense, exercising authority only within the boundaries set by the
sovereign People." Amar, supra note 173, at 1436.
194. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 , at 350-51 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
195. By extrapolating from the trust framework of governance, one sees that the
people of the individual states functioned as settlor of the state trust, whereas the states,
acting on behalf of their citizens, functioned as settlor of the national trust.
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this reason, Founders such as Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John
Marshall, and James Iredell, considered governments as sovereign only
within the sphere of their delegated power.196

A.

The States as Secondary Beneficiaries of the National Trust:
Protection Against the Risks of Aggregating Sovereignty

Under the trust framework, the states' role was not limited to serving
as trustee of their respective citizenries and as settlor of the trust
between the people of the nation and the national government. The
states played an additional, important role in the American system of
governance, serving as secondary beneficiary of the federal government's
trusteeship under the national trust. It is useful to think of the national
trust as a trust formed among the people of the states. 197 As discussed
earlier, the people of the nation served in the role of primary beneficiary
of the national trust. The national government owed a fiduciary duty to
the people, and by virtue of this cardinal responsibility, assumed an
ancillary duty to the states. The ancillary duty, embodied in the
Guarantee Clause and Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, functioned
to ensure that national policy could not completely subsume the interests
of the people of the individual states. More specifically, the federal duty
to the states could be described as a duty not to act outside delegated
powers without the consent of the People, or alternatively, a duty to
protect states powerless to protect themselves against plenary power.198

196. Amar, supra note 173, at 1437. "Just as a corporation could be delegated
limited sovereign privileges by the King-in-Parliament, so governments could be
delegated limited powers to govern. Within the limitations of their charters, governments could be sovereign, but that sovereignty could be bounded by the terms of the
delegation itself." Id. at 1435 (citation omitted).
197. Recall that Locke believed that government derived from a "contract among
people rather than between rulers and ruled." Doernberg, supra note 166, at 67. The
idea of a trust formed among and between states contrasts with the state sovereignty
theory, which views the Constitution as a contract among and between the states and,
accordingly, treats the states as free to renounce and withdraw from the contract. The
trust theory does not endorse this implication of the state sovereignty theory, but rather,
views the Constitution as manifesting the aggregation of sovereignty. As such, the
primary focus of the trust theory is on the national duties to which the formation of the
trust among and between the people of the states gave rise. See Walter Berns, The
Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in NATION OF STATES 139 (R. Goldwin 2d ed. 1973)
(discussing the implications of the state sovereignty theory).
I 98. Such consent could be expressed through a constitutional amendment, or
alternatively, through a constitutional moment. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
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The sovereign people of the individual states granted power to the
national government to maximize their own welfare. Aggregation of
individual sovereignty could only have been achieved by a feeling that
By aggregating
gains of aggregation would outweigh losses. 199
collective sovereignty at the national level, the people reconstituted
sovereignty that was previously concentrated in the people at the state
level. 200 Yet national power was to operate in tandem with the power
reserved by the people at the state level. To think as a common,
sovereign people, the people at the more localized levels of the states
needed assurance that their interests would not be stampeded by other
states wielding majority power through the national government. Thus,
the structural design of government needed to limit opportunities for
national overreaching---that is, opportunities to eat away at the power
reserved for the individual states and, accordingly, the rights reserved for
their citizens.

B.

The Federal Governments Duty Not to Destroy: The Structural
Importance of States to American Governance

The grant of plenary power over particular matters to the federal
government relies on the premise of states functioning as the secondary
beneficiaries of the national trust. The Antifederalists recognized that in
a country this vast, states could protect local interests from despotism at
the national level. . The single legislature was incapable of adequately
representing such diverse interests.201

PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (I 991 ).
199. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (I 965) (describing the rent-seeking and free-riding
interests that dominate collective action).
200. States' rightists and nationalists disagreed as to whether sovereignty was
concentrated principally in the people of the states or the people of the nation. Whereas
the states ' rightists viewed the Constitution as a compact among the sovereign peoples
of the individual states, the nationalists saw the Constitution as "a supreme statute
deriving from the supreme sovereign legislature-the People of the nation." Amar,
supra note 173, at 1452. I argue that regardless of whether one takes a states' rightists'
or nationalists' view, protection of the bounded sovereignty retained by the states-the
building blocks of the nation-was central to the Constitution. Under either view, the
redefinition of the sovereignty structure could only be achieved with the acquiescence
of the people themselves and the assurance that in exchange for sacrifices made on
behalf of the nation, the individual states would retain some ability to resist encroachment by the rest of the country.
201. WOOD, supra note 174, at 527 (citation omitted). For a discussion of
colonists' perceptions of the unrepresentative British assembly ruling over the states, see
Amar supra note 173, at 1445. Arguably, such perceptions gave rise to suspicion and
skepticism of power removed from local levels. The Articles of Confederation represent
one such manifestation of colonists' skepticism.
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The experience with British rule left the colonists with this indelible
anti-imperialist sentiment, but complete decentralization was not the
solution, either. What was needed was an intermediate form of authority
structure. As described by Akhil Amar, the Constitution's solution then
represented "a harmonious Newtonian solar system in which individual
states were preserved as distinct spheres, each with its own mass and
pull, maintained in their proper orbit by the gravitational force of a
common central body."202 Without a national duty to protect the
states, the national government's gravitational force threatened to drag
the states into it.
Moreover, the states' role as beneficiary of the trust was critical to the
envisioned scheme of government, because state power created "a double
security . . . as to the rights of the people. The different governments
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself."203 States needed credible means of exercising power against
overreaching by the federal government: Without a zone of autonomy
from the federal government's reins, the states would not possess
sufficient power and independence to serve the double security
function. 204 As such, the national government was to exercise power
over "certain enumerated objects only . . . leav[ing] to the several States

202. Amar, supra note 173, at 1449 (citation omitted).
203 . Bums, supra note 165, at 46 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See Madison's discussion of aggrandization of
power in the context of separation of powers: "(T]he great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those
who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives
to resist encroachments of the others . . . . Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. " THE FEDERALIST No. 51 , at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. ,
1961).
204. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of states as "a check on the
abuses of government power" as well as counterbalancing the national government in
order to protect "our fundamental liberties." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) (citations omitted); see also discussion infra part VII.B.
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a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."205 Of
course, the states' zone of autonomy has never been of fixed scope.
History has shown that the zone may contract when there is a growth of
federal power. 206 Thus, the federal government's duty to the secondary
beneficiaries of the states implies that the expansion of federal power
into such zones carries responsibilities with it. In particular, if the
national government took actions that removed state control over specific
issues, the national government assumed a duty to act as a fiduciary,
ensuring in good faith that the power shift did not decrease the welfare
of the states.
VII.

EXPRESSION OF THE TRUST: THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AND
THE TENTH AMENDMENT

A.

Origins of Powers and Duties

The Constitution represents the expression of the trust between the
people of the nation and the federal government. The Constitution
placed expansive powers in the federal government but also placed terms
and restrictions on the exercise of such powers. Like the powers granted
to any trustee, the Constitution entrusted the national government to act
for the betterment of the people, the primary beneficiaries of the trust.
For one, the Constitution granted Congress the power to tax, which is a
concurrent state power not subject to federal preemption. 207 Notably,
205. Burns, supra note 165, at 45 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton's discussion of the relative powers of
state and federal governments gives further support to the argument that a sphere of
autonomy was reserved to the states:
It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the
national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the
State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree
of influence which the State governments, if they administer their affairs with
uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people[, the
beneficiaries of the states' trusteeship.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton).
206. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 198, at 47-48 (discussing the constitutional
moment of the New Deal and the change in the nature of federal power).
207 . But see ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 30 (1984)
[hereinafter INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS].
Like the commerce power, the use of the taxing power as a regulatory device
has worked most frequently to preempt state activity . . . . However, clear
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concurrent powers extended far beyond taxation, encompassing specific
powers granted to Congress but not denied to the states, such as the
power to regulate commerce and the power to spend. The Supremacy
Clause,208 and the powers that ensue from it, empowered the federal
government to nullify state laws in conflict with federal law, and thereby
regulate and preempt state activity. 209 However, the Supremacy Clause
only applies to federal laws that comport with the other provisions of the
Constitution.
Federal action must not contravene constitutional mandate. The
Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment state that the exercise of
plenary power by the federal government faces restrictions. In this
capacity, the Guarantee Clause, together with the Tenth Amendment, is
an expression of the subsidiary trust between the states and the federal
government-tantamount to a statement that the states stand as the
secondary beneficiaries of the federal government's trusteeship, protected
against federal destruction. The Guarantee Clause states "that [t]he
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Most scholars agree that Republican
Form of Government." 210
Government is a government in which the rulers are controlled by the
people--"a government based on popular control."211 But only when
the people have the ability to shape and direct their respective state
governments is it possible for a republican government to exist. 212
Deborah Jones Merritt, a scholar who argues that the Guarantee Clause
is a shield for state autonomy, summarizes the dual charges of the
clause. She states that the clause prohibits the states from adopting
nonrepublican forms of government, and so long as the states comply,

manipulation of tax policy has also been used to "induce" state performance
of certain functions. In fact, the now familiar inducement versus coercion
standard "first evolved in cases challenging conditions attached to credits
against federal taxes awarded to encourage state development of a particular
program."
Id. (quoting Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role,
79 COL. L. REV. 858, 883 (1979)).
208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause specifically states: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land . . . ." Id.
209. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 24; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
supra note 207, at 25.
210. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4.
211. Deborah Jones Merritt, Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 23-25, N. 126 (1988) (citing J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 149
(C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 252 (J. Madison) (J.
Cooke Ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke Ed.
1961).
212. Merritt, supra note 211, at 25.
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prohibits the federal government from taking actions that would destroy
the states' republican character. 21 3 These two dimensions of the
Guarantee Clause reinforce each other, ensuring that republican
government is protected. So long as the states promote and preserve
republican governance, the Guarantee Clause entitles them to protection
against federal intrusion. 214 This interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause is supported by the history of the founding2 15 and has been
echoed by the federal courts in numerous, prominent cases of the past
century. 216 In other words, the Guarantee Clause pronounced that the
federal government was affirmatively duty-bound by the national trust
to protect qualifying state beneficiaries.
The Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," 217
bolsters the force of the Guarantee Clause as an expression of the states'
role as secondary beneficiaries of the national trust. Although the Tenth
Amendment has generally been found to "state[] but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered,"21 8 it is, nonetheless, impor-

213 . Id. (tracing the history and meaning of the Guarantee Clause).
214. Note that the Guarantee Clause interpretation discussed here does not
indemnify states from federal preemption. As noted by Deborah Jones Merritt, "[a]
republican government . .. need not exercise its authority over any particular substantive
area . . . . The guarantee clause assures the states the right to maintain autonomous,
republican governments. The [S]upremacy [C]lause, however, denies those governments
the power to regulate any fields properly preempted by Congress." Id. at 59.
215 . Id. at 29-36. "[B]oth advocates and foes of the new Constitution recognized
the[G)uarantee [C]lause as an attempt to mark the boundary between federal power and
state sovereignty." Id. at 35.
2 I 6. For example, the Sixth Circuit also made the very important statement that a
Guarantee Clause challenge to EPA regulations directing states to enforce federal
pollution standards "was neither frivolous nor irresponsible." Id. at 28 (citing Brown v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 838-40 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded/or consideration of
mootness, 431 U.S. 99 (I 977)). The court made the sagacious statement that the
disjunction between the power to spend and the power to tax would ravage popular
accountability and "encourage few even casually acquainted with the writings of
Montesquieu and the Federalist papers to assert that the states enjoyed a Republican
Form of Government." Id. (quoting Brown, 521 F.2d at 840.) Accordingly, the court
invalidated the offending regulations. Id. at 25-28.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
218. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1940). But see New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (stating that the Tenth Amendment confirms
that powers reserved by the states are protected by limits on the federal government's
constitutional powers).
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tant as a "declar[ation] of the relationship between the national and state
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment." 219 Moreover, the purpose of the Tenth Amendment was
to "allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise
fully their reserved powers."220
The Supreme Court has very visibly vacillated in its reading of the
Tenth Amendment, oscillating between the interpretation that the
Amendment places affirmative, justiciable limitations on federal
displacement of state power and the interpretation that the Amendment
is an inappropriate vehicle for challenging encroachments on sovereignty. For example, in 1918, the Court's majority opinion in Hammer v.
Dagenhari221 struck down a federal statute that excluded products of
child labor from interstate commerce, in an attempt to eliminate child
labor within the states. Justice Day, who wrote the majority opinion,
stated: "In interpreting the Constitution it must never be forgotten that
the Nation is made up of States, to which are entrusted the powers of
local government. And to them and to the people the powers not
expressly delegated to the National Government are reserved." 222
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, expressed his disagreement
with the majority: "I should have thought that the most conspicuous
decisions of this Court had made it clear that the power to regulate
commerce and other constitutional powers could not be cut down or
qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the
domestic policy of any State."223 Holmes was later vindicated by the
Court's holding in United States v. Darby Lumber. 224 In Darby
Lumber, the Court upheld the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
which established a minimum wage for a forty-hour work week as well
as overtime for some interstate activities. Writing for the majority,
Justice Stone's opinion resonated with the principles expounded in
Justice Holmes' Dagenhart dissent: "[T]he power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause is plenary to exclude any article from interstate
commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution."225

219. Darby Lumber, 312 U.S. at 124.
220. Id.
221. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
222. Id. at 275.
223 . Id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
224. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
225. Id. at 116; see also Jennifer Smith, Judicial Review and Modern Federalism:
Canada and the United States, in ROLE OF THE STATE, supra note 150, at 118-19
(discussing the shift in reasoning by the majority in Darby and Dagenhart).
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More than a quarter century after Darby Lumber, the Supreme Court
revisited the Tenth Amendment in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 226 and reversed the course of its long-standing jurisprudence.
In National League, the Court recognized that the states needed judicial
assistance in resisting federal usurpation of their powers and held that
Congress could not impose federal minimum wage standards on state
employees because it "would impair [their] ability to function effectively
within a federal system" and destroy their "separate and independent
existence. "227 In so holding, the Court also recognized a sphere of
inviolable state powers. National League was not the end of the story,
however. The decision was effectively overturned by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,228 which seemed to seal the
fate of the Tenth Amendment by concluding that the Amendment was
mere tautology and did not establish positive rights on behalf of the
states. Garcia held that the Tenth Amendment did not immunize a city
transit authority from the federal government's power to regulate
workers' hours and wages. Justice Blackmun cited the difficulties of
defining traditional state functions entitled to immunity from federal
regulation, emphasizing that the Framers intended for the restraints on
federal power to inhere in the daily functioning of the federal govemment.229 Thus, procedural limitations of the federal system of government were more appropriate for resolving disputes than judicially created
restrictions on federal power. 230 Thus, with Garcia, Americans saw
arguments for judicial safeguards for federalism give way to arguments
based on faith in the political process.
Many thought Garcia marked the death of federalism, but the recent
case of New York v. United States, 231 gave reason to believe that the
Court was willing to recognize federalism as a substantive constitutional
principle. In New York, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth
Amendment protects the sovereignty reserved to states by prohibiting
congressional commandeering of state's legislative processes "by directly

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 851-52.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Id. at 554; see discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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compel~ing them to enact a federal regulatory program. "232 Pursuant
to this holding, the Court struck down a portion of the federal LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which required states unable to
provide for disposal of waste to take title to the waste. Yet the potential
implications of New York were minimized by the Court's concession that
Congress could have had the power to preempt state radioactive waste
regulation. 233 In the end, New York was another swing of the pendulum that continued the pattern of oscillation that had been set decades
earlier.
Some have interpreted the Court's mercurial position as trivializing,
and even subverting, any strength or significance one might attach to the
Tenth Amendment. However, the fact that the Court has not taken the
hard-and-fast line that the Tenth Amendment constitutionally limits
congressional power to displace certain state functions does not
undermine the contention that the Tenth Amendment, coupled with the
Guarantee Clause, gives rise to federal duties to states. Rather, the
Court's vacillation reflects the difficulty of enforcing the national
government's duty as trustee to the states, and should be interpreted as
a call for workable principles of federal-state relations.
B.

Reconciling the Dual Sovereignty and the Sovereign People
Paradigms

Traditionally, the relationship between state government, federal
government, the people of the states, and the people of the nation has
been classified under one of two paradigms: The people as sovereign
or dual sovereignty. Dual sovereignty between the states and federal
government places all powers of sovereignty, except those explicitly
granted to the federal government, in the state governments. 234 The
notion of dual sovereignty has animated some of the most important
discussions of American federalism of the past century, including Justice
O'Connor's recent majority opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, which held
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not invalidate the
Missouri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision, as applied to
state judges. 235 Underscoring the importance of states to democratic

232 . Id. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
233. Id. at 160.
234. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS ' DESIGN 30-75 (1987).
235. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri
Constitution being challenged stood in apparent conflict to the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which made it illegal for employers to discharge
workers over 40 on the basis of age. The Court held that before the ADEA could be
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governance, O'Connor described the basic precepts of our Constitional
system of dual sovereignty: 236
'[T]he people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and
endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence,'
... ' [W]ithout the States in union there could be no political body as the
United States.' Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution,
but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of
the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the
National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States. 237

The dual sovereignty paradigm described by O'Connor and others stands
in contrast to the concept that sovereignty resides in the people of the
nation. 238 Whereas the crux of the dual sovereignty paradigm lies in
preservation of inviolable state power to counteract federal power, the
basic tenet of the sovereign people paradigm is maximization of the
people's ability to exercise their sovereign rights (which may or may not
be achievable through dual sovereignty.)
The dual trusts model proposed by this Article finds false dichotomy
between these two mainstream paradigms regarding the vestiture of
power in the federal government. Instead of viewing state and federal
government as either dual, independent sovereigns or as agents of a
single, omnipotent sovereign (the people), the trusts model accommodates both views. Under the trusts model, the power of the state and
federal governments, which is usually referred to as the power of the
sovereign by the dual sovereignty paradigm, would be described as the
power of a trustee, limited by the terms of the trust relationship. Also,
in contrast to the notion that the people of the nation act as a single
sovereign to control the federal government, the trusts model envisions
federal government as the agent of the sovereign people of the nation,
but also duty-bound to the states. The federal government serves as
agent of the sovereign people of the states (subgroups of the larger
sovereign) through its relationship with state governments.

applied to the forced retirement of state judges, Congress had to make a "plain
statement" to that effect. Id. at 464.
236. Id. at 457.
237. Id. (citing Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), quoting Lane County v.
Oregon, 7 Wall. 76 (1869)).
238. See discussion supra parts V.D. to VI.A.
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In accordance with the Founders' views of sovereignty and governance, academic discussions of federalism that center on the doctrine of
dual sovereignty can be properly recast around the doctrine of dual
trusteeship. With the growth of national power over areas of policy
traditionally controlled by the states, the doctrine of dual sovereignty
began to languish as a conceptual tool for analyzing problems of
federalism. 239 As New Deal programs empowered Congress to act in
most areas of economic and social concern and simultaneously
diminished powers that had formerly belonged in the exclusive sphere
of the states, the doctrine of dual sovereignty became moribund.240
The dual trusts model is capable of resisting such an unfortunate fate
because it allows for shifts in the relative powers of state and federal
governments if the sovereign people have mandated the shift.241 Yet,
in the event of a shift, the federal government, in the capacity of trustee,
would assume an affirmative, fiduciary duty to protect states
disempowered to act on their own behalf.
VIII.

REFINING THE TRUSTS MODEL OF GOVERNANCE:
INSTRUCTIVE FORERUNNERS

Having presented the merits of the trust model as a conceptual tool,
the question remains: What federal responsibilities does the trust
relationship impose with respect to states fiscally affected by illegal
immigration? Moving away from the abstract, theoretical contours of
the trust paradigm, to an analysis of the federal duties owed to states that
pick up the tab for federally designed and engineered immigration
programs, this Article looks for guidance and extrapolates from other
areas of public law where the trust doctrine has been invoked.
The notion of federal trust is not new. It has been applied in the
context of federal Indian law, coastal management, and international law
applicable to the relationship between the United States and its
commonwealths and territories.242 The existence of a legally enforceable trust underlies the application of the trust doctrine in many of these
analogous contexts. Of the prototypes, federal Indian law and international law are especially instructive because they demonstrate a trustee's
duties to beneficiaries with sovereign qualities. For each of the
illustrative prototypes, the Article probes to find the underlying purpose

239. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 5-10.
240. Id.
241. Such a mandate might take the fonn of a constitutional amendment, or more
probably, a constitutional moment, such as the New Deal.
242. See discussion infra notes 243-291 and accompanying text.
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of the trusteeship and its rules of interpretation. The analogies presented
here provide insight as well as some precedence for conceiving the state
and national governments as trustees with decisionmaking power over
fiscal resources for the benefit of the people of the nation and the states.

A.
1.

Land Use

The Public Trust Doctrine

The "public trust" is the specific label placed on states' special titles
to coastal waters, the lands beneath, and the living resources inhabiting
the waters. 243 According to the public trust doctrine, these special
titles are held by states in trust for the benefit of the public and establish
the public's right to make use of the trust waters, underlying lands,
tidelands, and resources for recognized public uses. 244 The doctrine's
intended purpose was to function as a "proscriptive statement on the
limits of sovereign authority."245 The public trust doctrine is an
ancient property law principle which derived from English common law
heritage and now exists in every U.S. state. 246 The common law
heritage of the public trust doctrine has enabled it to adapt to changing
social conditions while maintaining its central character of assuring the
public's continued benefit from waterways. 247 It is believed that the
doctrine's flexibility will ensure its continued applicability and survival.24s

243. DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK xvi
(1990); see also JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 5 (1994).
244. Id.
245. Randal David Orton, Inventing the Public Trust Doctrine: California Water
Lake and the Mono Lake Controversy 25 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Cal. (Los Angeles)).
246. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (holding that the
public trust doctrine applies in every state to all tidal waters); see also ARCHER, supra
note 243, at 4.
247. ARCHER, supra note 243, at 4-5.
248. SLADE, supra note 243, at xxi.
The Public Trust Doctrine has evolved from preserving the public's rights to
use trust lands and waters for commerce, navigation and fishing, to protecting
modem uses that are "related to the natural uses peculiar to that resource."
This dynamic nature, firmly documented by the courts over the centuries and
fundamental to the application of the doctrine, has enabled it to persist for over
1,500 years.
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The public trust doctrine vests authority in states by virtue of their
control over state property. Pursuant to the doctrine, states have the
power to govern and manage land, water, and living resources that fall
within the scope of the doctrine as their own property.249 States
properly exercising public trust power are not susceptible to takings
challenges because they are considered to be exercising authority over
their own property, not the property of private individuals. 250 Similarly, the national government, exercising trust authority over national fiscal
and other resources, is viewed as exercising power over resources
belonging to it. Yet, in both these cases, the government "ownership"
is subject to a trust for the benefit of the public subject to certain rights
of usage.
2.

Limitations Imposed by Jus Publicum and Jus Privatum

Grants of public trust lands to private owners are subject to the public
trust and to the state's duty to "protect the ~ublic interest from any use
that would substantially impair the trust." 51 Consequently, the state
trust of coastal areas is a hybrid, divided into two forms of titles: }us
publicum (the public's trust title) andjus privatum (a private proprietary
title). The }us privatum is the title to the transferable property held by
the government in the use and possession of trust lands. The }us
privatum may be conveyed into private ownership, but the conveyance
will be conditioned. That is, thejus privatum will always be subservient
to the dominantjus publicum, the collective public right to use and enjoy
public trust lands, waters, and their resources for particular traditional
purposes, such as navigation and fishing.252 Thus, the use of public
trust land held in }us privatum will always be restricted by the }us publicum.253 Under English common law, conflicts between the exercise of

Id. (citation omitted).
249. Id. at xxiii (positing that a state governing and managing public lands as its
own property "is in sharp contrast to a State regulating a citizen's private property
through its police powers").
250. id.
251. ARCHER, supra note 243, at 4.
252. id. at 6-11 ; see also SLADE, supra note 243, at 176 (nearly one-third of trust
land in the United States is privately owned).
253. Illinois Cen. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455 (1892).
The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has
an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property . . . . Any
grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by
which the property was held by the State can be resumed at any time.
Id.
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private and public rights in public trust lands and waters were decided
in favor of the public. 254
The bifurcated ownership interests that arise when the }us privatum is
conveyed into private ownership spawn tension between public and
private rights because individual rights in conveyances that have been
made for purely private, non-water dependent, or related purposes
conflict with common rights of usage in those lands. 255 Both the
English common law and its American progeny have given some
resolution to the problem by establishing mechanisms that operate ex
ante to regulate the state's conveyance of the jus privatum of trust lands
to private ownership. To validly convey the }us privatum to private
ownership, the state must authorize the conveyance through legislation,
which must describe the conveyance in clear and definite language, and
all ambiguities must be construed in favor of the state and against the
private party. 256 The conveyance must primarily serve the public
interest and benefits to private parties must be subsidiary, and must not
substantially impair the public interest in the remaining land or
water. 257 Non-compliance with any of these requirements constitutes
violation of the public trust doctrine, and may void the conveyance.
This is because states lack the authority to "abdicate [their] trust over
property in which the whole people are interested."258
One can view the tension between private and public interests arising
under the }us privatum as analogous to the tension between national
(aggregated) and state (disaggregated) interests regarding accountability
and control for illegal immigration matters. Limitations placed on the
conveyance of the }us privatum are generally instructive of the state
trustee's inalienable, affirmative duty to maintain and protect the corpus
254. SLADE, supra note 243, at 180.
255. ARCHER, supra note 243, at 9; see Illinois Cen. R.R. 146 U.S. 387.
256. State legislatures may delegate the authority to trust lands to a state agency.
SLADE, supra note 243, at 177.
257. Id. at 178. With respect to impairment, Slade notes:
On occasion courts have recognized that some impairment of the trust resource
of the public's trust rights therein is unavoidable, even though the degree of
impairment may not be substantial. In such cases, some courts have noted the
states' "duty as trustee to consider the effect of taking on the public trust, and
to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by
the trust".
Id. at 179 (quoting National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 658 P.2d 709, 728,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983)).
258 . Illinois Cen. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 ; see also SLADE, supra note 243, at 179.
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of the trust. 259 Applied to federal duties regarding immigration
matters, the public trust doctrine militates in favor of a clear standard of
federal performance when the federal government assumes trustee duties
by preempting state power to legislate and assumes responsibility for
reallocating resources. The public trust doctrine implies that the state
has heightened responsibility for its decisionmaking in a trustee capacity.
Moreover, the public trust doctrine underscores the fact that reallocation
by the trustee must primarily further the interests of the primary
beneficiaries (the people) and secondary beneficiaries (the states) and
that reallocation must take place in such a way that the beneficiaries are
able to discern it. Yet it should be noted that although the public trust
doctrine sheds some insight on duties of trustees, it is distinguished from
the dual trust paradigm by the fact that the beneficiaries are not
themselves entities protecting sovereign interests of some subgroup.
Other federal trust examples, as in the Indian context, provide further
insight on the rights of states' interests affected by the loss of resources
as a result of an allocation decision made by the federal government as
trustee.

B.
1.

Indian Trusts

The Nature of Governmental-Trustee Duties

The United States government has a fiduciary, trustee relationship with
Indian tribes and their trust property.260 That is, it has agreed to act
in good faith to promote the best interest of the Indians. Like the
national trust paradigm put forth in this Article, the Indian trust is
distinct from most other forms of trusts, such as private trusts, because
"strict trust law cannot fully accommodate the sovereign nature of both
the trustee and the Indian tribal beneficiary." 261 Commentators have
259. However, some believe that the public trust doctrine is "little more than a
sham-a mask for the unauthorized substitution ofjudicial for administrative discretion."
Orton, supra note 245, at 22. Under such a view, the public trust doctrine provides
cannot provide much guidance for reifying other trust paradigms, such as the national
trust paradigm proposed in this Article.
260. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46-47 (1913).
261. GILBERT L. HALL, INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAW, DUTY
OF PROTECTION: THE FEDERAL INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 2 (I 979). I do not wish
to overstate the similarity between the Indian tribes and the states. The sovereign nature
of states may be distinguished from the sovereign nature of Indian tribes. As noted by
Judith Resnick,
Blurring the lines between "state" and "Indian tribe" may obscure the political
differences between the two "sovereigns." At least in theory, states have
entered into a compact, called the United States Constitution, and willfully
ceded powers to a central government. At least in theory, states participate via
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offered a few, slightly contrasting descriptions of the federal trust
responsibility to Indians. For example, the Department of Interior
describes the crux of the federal trust duty as an obligation to protect
"valuable Indian lands, water minerals, and other natural resources."262
The American Indian Policy Review Commission describes the trust duty
as an obligation to safeguard and promote Indian self-government and
economic independence by providing Indians with social and economic
resources that would raise their standard of living to a level commensurate with their non-Indian neighbors. 263 Others view the trust responsibility as a duty to provide an Indian aid program, which would facilitate
restoration of their tribal economies and invigorate self-government. 264
All the descriptions of trust duties based on Indian treaties and
agreements, judicial decisions, tribal statements, and congressional acts,
point to a common purpose: "the continued survival of Indian tribes as
self-governing peoples." 265 From this purpose ensues the duty to
protect, not control, Indians in the defense of their groperty and rights,
as well as the duty to provide certain services.2
The beneficiary
arrangement is parallel to the arrangement under the national trust. Just
their representatives in Congress in the decisions of the national government.
Such claims cannot be made, even in theory, for the Indian tribes, whose
representatives neither signed the Constitution nor sit in Congress.
Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 , 680 (1989).
262. HALL, supra note 261, at 2 (quoting Oversight Hearings on BIA Management
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs (Aug. I, 1977) (statement of Under
Secretary James A. Joseph, Dept. of the Interior)).
263. Id. at 2. Hall cites The American Indian Policy Review Commission, which
described the trust responsibility as
an established legal obligation which requires the United States to protect and
enhance Indian trust resources and tribal self-government and to provide
economic and social programs necessary to raise the standard of living and
social well-being of the Indian people to a level comparable to the non-Indian
society.

Id.
264. Id. at 2-3; see also Larry B. Leventhal, American Indians-the Trust
Responsibility: An Overview, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 625 (1985) (presenting an overarching
analysis of the federal trust responsibility to Indians).
265 . HALL, supra note 261 , at 3. "Protection is the key word used in the definition
of the trust responsibility: protection of Indians, their property and rights by the United
States government". Id. The three broad areas of federal trust responsibilities for
Indians are: "I. protection oflndian trust property, 2. Protection of the Indian right to
self-government [and] 3. Provision of those social, medical and educational services
necessary for survival of the tribe." Id. at 9.
266. Id. at 3.
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as the people of the nation are the primary beneficiaries and the states
and their citizens are the secondary beneficiaries under the national trust,
individual Indians are the primary beneficiaries and the tribes, through
which the individuals receive benefits, are the secondary beneficiaries
under the Indian trust. 267

2.

Evincing the Trust: Treaties

Treaties and agreements, the United States Constitution, judicial
decisions, and federal statutes all serve as sources for the government's
trust responsibility to Indians. An example of trust responsibilities
assumed under treaties includes the U.S. treaty with the Kaskaskias
Indians. This treaty stated, "the United States will take the Kaskaskias
tribe under their immediate care and patronage, and will afford them a
protection as effectual against the other Indian tribes and against all
other persons whatever as it is enjoyed by their own citizens. "268
Constitutional powers and duties regarding Indians originate from the
Commerce Clause, the power to make treaties, the power to negotiate for
conditions of peace, the power to rirovide for the general welfare, and
the power over federal territories. 69 As pertains to federal relations
with Indians, the treaty-making power as well as the commerce power,
have been interpreted by many courts to be as much a limitation on
federal power as a grant of broad authority.27 Federal statutes fortify
the federal government's duties to the Indians. As recognized by the
Court of Appeals in Seneca Nation v. United States, legislation such as
the Trade and Intercourse Acts establishes a "special relationship

°

267 . Id. at 12.
268 . Id. at 4 (quoting Treaty with the Kaskaskias, August 13, 1803, art. 2, 7 Stat.
78). "[T]he ' undersigned Kings, Chiefs, and Warriors, for themselves and all parts of
the Creek Nation within the limits of the United States, do acknowledge themselves, and
the said parts of the Creek Nation, to be under the protection of the United States."' Id.
(quoting Treaty of August 7, 1790 with the Creek Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 35).
The contracting parties agree that the laws now in force, and such others as
may be passed, regulating the trade and intercourse, and for the preservation
of peace with the various tribes of Indians under the protection and guardianship of the Government of the United States, shall be as binding and obligatory
upon the said Utah as if said laws had been enacted for their sole benefit and
protection.
Id. (quoting Treaty with the Utah of 1849, art. IV, CHARLES KAPPLER, KAPPLER'S
INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES, Vol. II, 8-10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt.
Printing Office, 1904)).
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id.; see United States v. Kagama, I 18 U.S. 375 (1886); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
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between the Federal Government and those Indians covered by the
legislation. " 271
3. Interpretation and Enforcement of Trustee Obligations: The Role
of the Judiciary
a.

Fiduciary Obligations and Rules of Interpretation

Judicial decisions are a very important source of pronouncements
regarding federal trust duties to Indians. Generally, decisions will
consider the sum of treaties, legislation, and the history of arrangements
between the United States Government and Indians. In response to the
unequal bargaining power between the tribal beneficiaries and the
government trustee in treaty negotiations, the United States Supreme
Court has developed rules for interpreting the meaning of treaties and
federal laws pertaining to Indians. 272 Under such rules of interpretation, federal courts will use heightened scrutiny when interpreting Indian
treaties as compared to other international treaties. Furthermore, such
rules of interpretation compel courts and federal agencies to act in
benefit of Indian rights, when they may not have done so otherwise. 273
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 274 is the first case to imply the trust
duties of the federal government to Indians. Cherokee Nation reasoned
that the relationship between Indians and the United States "resembles
that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for
protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief of
their wants. "275 The Court viewed the trust relationship as a source of

271. 173 Ct. Cl. 917, 925 (1965).
272. HALL, supra note 261, at 5. For a list of federal cases defining and applying
these rules, see Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian
Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth "-How
Long a Time ls That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 607 (1975); and Reid Peyton Chambers,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians , 27 STAN. L. REV.
1213, 1214-15 (1975).
273. HALL, supra note 261, at 5; see also Chambers, supra note 272 (discussing the
development of the Indian trust doctrine through federal common law adjudication).
274. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
275. Id. at 17; see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (describing
Indian tribes as "wards of the nation . .. dependent on the United States . . . . From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there
arises the dttty of protection, and with it the power").
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federal responsibility as well as a source of federal power. 276 The
Court narrowed decisions which seemed to legitimize the broad exercise
of federal plenary power over lndians277 by finding that positive duties
arose from plenary trustee power. 278
Numerous cases illustrate the Court's view of federal duties. In United
States v. Creek Nation, the Supreme Court found that constitutional
provisions restricted the plenary trust power, and held that the United
States could not expropriate Indian land without providing 'Just
compensation for them; for that 'would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation. "'279 Similarly, in Seminole Nation v.
United States, the Court invoked equitable considerations to rule in favor
of the Seminole Indians who were suing the United States for failure to
observe particular treaties, agreements, and statutes.280 As stated by
the Court, the United States' obligations of trusteeship made it more than
a mere contracting party. 281 The Court went on to emphasize the high
standard to which the government should hold itself: As trustee, the
government is subject to the most exacting :fiduciary standards in its
dealings with the Indians. 282
The United States' fiduciary obligation under the Indian trust was also
relied upon by the Court of Claims when it found that the United States
had the duty to properly manage Indian money under its trusteeship.
Thus, the court held that the United States was liable for failing to

276. See Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (upholding the application of the 1885 Indian
Appropriation Act - federal criminal law - to Indian country on the basis of the
guardian-ward relationship); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding
federal action in violation of the terms of the I 867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge on the
grounds that the federal government possessed plenary power over Indian affairs).
277. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553; see also William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of
Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987) (describing the broad
power of Congress to define the parameters of Indian sovereignty).
278. But see Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (stating that the
"Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary" when the
Executive branch is faced with congressionally-imposed duties inconsistent with the
protection of Indian resources).
279. 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935)(citation omitted). The Court further explained:
The tribe was a dependent Indian community under the guardianship of the
United States, and therefore its property and affairs were subject to the control
and management of that government. But this power to control and manage
was not absolute. While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting
and advancing the tribe, it was subject to limitations inhering in such
guardianship and to pertinent consitutional restrictions.
Id. at I 09-1 0; see also Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment
Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the "Sioux Nation" Rule, 61 OR. L. REV. 245
(1982).
280. 316 U.S. 286, 295 (1942).
281. Id. at 296.
282. Id. at 297.
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deposit Indian funds in the Menominee Log Fund, a Treasury account
which carried a higher interest rate than other Treasury accounts. 283
A district court affirmed this principle more than 25 years later, holding
that, by virtue of its ''unquestioned . . . trust obligation to the Indian
people," it had a duty to invest Indian trust funds in accounts that
produced income.284
b.

Extrapolating from the Jurisprudence of Indian Trusts

Immigration legislation, such as !RCA, which involves an element of
bargaining between states and the federal government for the exchange
of cost-imposing immigration measures and federal assistance, shares
characteristics with treaties between Indians and the United States.
Although such legislation is not technically a formal agreement between
the federal government and the states, as a treaty would be, the exchange
of obligations and the creation of accompanying rights between states
and the federal government resembles the promises enshrined in most
Indian treaties. In both situations the United States Government
negotiates and -bargains with entities that have sovereign, self-governing
qualities. The Supreme Court has recognized the sovereign nature of
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" which existed as "distinct
political societ[ies] ... capable of managing [their] own affairs and
governing [themselves]."285 This status of the Indian tribes is analogous to the states of the Union. 286 Thus, drawing from the example
of the Indian Trust, rules of interpretation applied to immigration
legislation should favor states when it is apparent that they possessed

283. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 59 F.Supp. 137, 141 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (In the
capacity of trustee, the United States is "under the obligation to use funds in its hands
in the way most beneficial to plaintiff.").
284. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238,
I 243 (N.D. Cal. I 973). The Court concluded that trust duties include the duty to use
"reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive". Id. at 1245.
285. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 15, 16 (1831).
286. Judith Resnick argues that the multiple court systems, including federal, state,
and tribal courts, is dominated by the federal courts which possess enormous power yet
continue to allow state and tribal courts to thrive. Resnick, supra note 261, at 740-59.
Resnick contends that by exploring the relationship between federal courts and Indian
tribes together with the history and treatment of Indian tribes, we can illuminate the
relationship between state and federal systems, and come to better understand the role
of "brute force" in constitutionalism. Id.
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significantly less bargaining power than the federal government which
enacted the legislation.
C.

An Excursus on American Commonwealths: The United States
Relationship with its Associated States

The relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, a
commonwealth in free association with the United States, and between
the United States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, parts of
which are now in free association with the United States,287 is characterized by power disparities and dependence. This situation calls to
mind the situation facing states dependent on federal funds for programs
and services related to illegal immigration. Both Puerto Rico and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands fall under the category of
associated state, "an entity that has delegated certain competences ...
to a principal state, although it retains its international status as a
state."288 As described by Michael Reisman:
Where two states of unequal power establish formal and durable links, we may
speak of an "association". . . . A relationship of association in contemporary
international law is characterized by recognition of the significant subordination
of and delegations of competence by one of the parties (the associate) to the
other (the principal) but maintenance of the continuing international status of
statehood of each component. . . . Association involves a recognition of the
political dependence of an entity, but at the same time an insistence on its
continuing discrete identity under the international scrutiny accorded to all
states.289

As the principal in the association with Puerto Rico and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the United States has taken on a
fiduciary duty to its associates.
The power relationship characterizing the U.S. associations is
manifested in several ways. By virtue of its relationship with the United
States, which is based on "a bilateral compact of association between the

287. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is also known as Micronesia and
consists of four entities: the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau. In 1975, the Northern Marianas became a
Commonwealth. The U.S. approved Compacts of Free Association with the Federated
States of Micronesia and the Marshal Islands in 1983. Trusteeship Council Reviews
Situation in Palau, UN CHRONICLE, Sept. 1991, at 38. Free association replaces
trusteeship with some form of self-government, an arrangement characterized by neither
pure independence nor pure supervision. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, PUERTO Rico AND THE
INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW ROLES IN ASSOCIATION 10 (1975).
288. Hurst Hannum & Richard B. Lillich, The Concept ofAutonomy in International
Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L. L. 858, 859 n.13 (1980).
289. REISMAN, supra note 287, at 10, 19.
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metropolitan state and its former colony,"290 Puerto Rico is not subject
to federal income tax. Moreover, Puerto Rico benefits from the umbrella
of U.S. protection, has free access to U.S. markets, and is favored by tax
incentives to stimulate investment. 291 In addition, Puerto Rico receives
over $3.7 billion dollars in federal funds and federal guarantees for loans
received by the Puerto Rican government. Puerto Ricans also have
American citizenship, but they are not able to vote in federal elections---with representation limited to a non-voting resident commissioner
on Capitol Hill.
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is also subordinate to the
United States in many of its activities. First and foremost, the United
States retains military authority in exchange for American aid to the
region. 292
Although the associated state relationship provides a vivid example of
a dependency relationship that the U.S . federal government dominates,
the courts, unfortunately, have not spoken on the United States' duty to
its associated states. Thus, this area provides no real guidance as to
what role the U.S. judiciary should take to remedy federal abdication of
duties owed to beneficiaries of the federal trusteeship. Given the highly
political nature of the associated state relationship, it is unlikely that the
court will ever speak on the question of federal duties to associated
states. Does a similar fate await the immigration states? The answer
does not have to be "Yes."

IX.

TRUSTEESHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY: LESSONS FOR THE
COURTS

Analysis of the federal government's Guarantee Clause and Tenth
Amendment duties under the trust paradigm differs from traditional
analyses because it imposes a higher standard of public review of the
federal government's performance when the federal government assumes
trustee duties by preempting state power to legislate and by taking
responsibility for reallocating resources.

290. Id. at XI.
291. House Backs Puerto Rico Referendum, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG.,
Oct. 26, I 990, at 795.
292. Clyde Habennan, Micronesia Resents a Far Land Called Washington, N .Y .
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1985, at A2.
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Like a term in a contract, a promise to assist states in a particular
manner in connection with a particular statutory scheme-----particularly
when the scheme imposes hardship on select states----represents a
bargained-for condition on which passage of a bill may turn. The Court
has advanced compelling reasons for federal dominance, but the question
of fiscal accountability remains. The Court has shown, as in the case of
coastal waters and Indian tribes, that it can play a role in ensuring that
the federal government does not disempower states without meeting the
accompanying responsibilities that arise from such disempowerment.
The federal government is the trustee of the national trust, and the
executive branch is specifically responsible for executing policy that will
impact the trust's beneficiaries. The Court should use strict rules of
interpretation, as it has in Indian trust cases, when reviewing the actions
of those administering laws .. Such rules should ensure that the executive
branch acts vigorously and faithfully to carry out the national trusteeship
for the states. Moreover, such rules should negate the federal impetus
to delegate program costs to states.
The great power that inheres in judicial review renders the Court a
depository of significant political power. Thus, the decision to leave
resolution to the political process is, in and of itself, a decision not to
use the political power possessed by the Court. As discussed by Henry
Monaghan:
[The Court has a] power to fashion a substructure of implementing ' legislative'
rules-rules that are admittedly not integral parts of the Constitution . . ..
Since the states and federal government have apparently not taken steps to
create a self-regulating regime, and since the Court is necessarily involved in
the definition of the dimensions of the constitutional rights involved, there
seems little reason for the Court not to prescribe rules sufficient to create selfregulation.293

If the Court should continue to hold that state sovereign interests are
better protected by the procedural safeguards built into the federal
system of governance than by judge-made limitations on federal
power,294 then the federal government must develop self-regulating
guidelines and mechanisms that prevent and remedy failures in our
system of federalism, which, if left uncorrected, threaten to undermine
the intent of the Framers and our system of federal governance. The
task is formidable, but the trusts model should be instructive. Legisla-

293. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Consitutiona/ Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. I, 23 (1975) (discussing the "utility of providing the police with guidance in the
Miranda and lineup situations so that they may understand (and presumably follow) their
duty with regard to individual liberties") (citations omitted).
294. See discussion supra n.56 and accompanying text.
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tion to prevent unfunded federal mandating is not an answer, because
such legislation does not resolve the issue of backdoor unfunded
mandating, which is central to the problem in the immigration area. The
Court can and should play a role in umpiring federalism issues that arise
in the context of backdoor unfunded immigration mandates.
X.

CONCLUSION

The states' claims for reimbursement of immigration costs find no
easy answers. Certainly, for the Court to find that the states have a
cause of action under the Tenth Amendment or the Guarantee Clause for
reimbursement of all costs incurred in association with illegal immigration, a radical new jurisprudence would be required. The Court is
unlikely to go that far. However, partial federal nonfeasance, as in the
instance of the Attorney General's failure to develop regulations
necessary to disburse the "Immigration Emergency Fund" or failure to
reimburse states for the costs of incarcerating illegal immigrants, lends
itself to analysis under the trust paradigm and calls for rules of
interpretation that should be inspired by jurisprudence from other areas
of governmental trusteeship. Applying the trust paradigm provides
greater guidance than other standards in analyzing the state claims for
reimbursement, including questions as to whether conditions on federal
funding are simply pressure (a valid exercise of the spending power) or
coercion (an invalid exercise of the spending power). 295
The Constitution properly limited the states' power to act on their own
behalf in the immigration sphere, but this constitutional mandate
presupposed minimal structural protections inherent in the underlying
trusteeship of the federal government--protections including fiscal
accountability. As history has shown, federal plenary power over
immigration has threatened and commandeered the autonomy and
resources of immigration states. Congressional proposals to further limit
immigrant access to federal benefits will impose future costs on states
that have no choice but to ensure the welfare of their residents.
Congress should think before it indirectly delegates program costs. In
the event Congress fails to do so, the Court should step in, as it has in
the past, and hold the federal government to its trusteeship duties.

295.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
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